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Rethinking Formalisation: A Conceptual Critique and Research Agenda 
Max Gallien and Vanessa van den Boogaard 
 
Summary 
The concept of ‘formalisation’ has been ubiquitous in development discourse and 
policymaking in the early twenty-first century. It has underpinned policy interventions and 
proposals from tax registration to property titling, and a range of measures intended to 
connect informal entities with state institutions or formally structured markets. Despite the 
policy enthusiasm, however, the outcomes of formalisation policies have frequently been 
disappointing. We argue that this disconnect lies in the concept of formalisation itself and 
that common approaches to formalisation are often rooted in three conceptual fallacies: 
(a) there is a binary distinction between formal and informal economic actors; (b) all informal 
economic actors are alike; and (c) ‘becoming’ formal necessarily spurs a set of positive 
externalities. These conceptual confusions pay insufficient attention to contextual complexity 
and the political and social dynamics that shape informality in a given context, and are 
frequently rooted in the practicalities and power structures that shape knowledge creation in 
this area. Consequently, we argue for a new research agenda on formalisation that 
challenges both its conventional conceptual foundations and the practices of research that 
engage with it. 
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Introduction 
The concept of ‘formalisation’ has been ubiquitous in development discourse and 
policymaking in the early twenty-first century. Formalisation policies have long been popular 
among international and domestic policymakers (e.g. Durand-Lasserve et al. 2007; Gurría 
2019; OECD 2007, 2017; Quan 2000; Russell 2010; Innovation Policy Platform n.d.; USAID 
2005; ILO 2015), while also being at the centre of expansive research projects, including 
large-scale field experiments with policy interventions.1 To address what is often perceived 
as the pervasive ‘problem’ of informality in many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs),2 
the idea of ‘development through formalisation’ has underpinned a range of policy 
interventions and proposals, including processes of registration, taxation, accounting, or 
other means of connecting informal entities with state institutions or formally structured 
markets. Such policies have often been motivated by the idea that ‘formalising’ institutional 
relationships can provide low-cost and ‘win-win’ interventions by providing both novel 
revenues to states and developmental benefits to individuals, firms, or households, such as 
access to credit or public services. These ideas have been prominent in discussions around 
issues as diverse as property rights, taxation, global value chains, and financial inclusion.  
Despite the policy enthusiasm, however, the outcomes of formalisation policies have 
frequently been disappointing. More often than not, optimistic promises of untapped 
revenue, the revival of ‘dead capital’, and the entrepreneurship potential of the informal 
economy have failed to materialise in the face of administrative challenges and local 
resistance. Meanwhile, as Bruhn and McKenzie (2014: 186) note, the ‘majority of 
microenterprises in most developing countries remain informal despite more than a decade 
of reforms aimed at making it easier and cheaper for them to formalize’. Given that policy 
interventions do not appear to be solving the ‘problem’ of informality or leading to the 
presumed benefits of ‘formality’, we argue that there is a need to reconsider the conceptual 
foundations of academic and policy approaches to formalisation and to question the 
underlying premises of work in this field. Through a review of common research and policy 
approaches, and case studies on two types of formalisation policies – tax registration and 
land titling – we argue that the frequent lack of predictive capacity of formalisation theories is 
rooted in fundamental problems in the conceptualisation of formalisation itself. While there 
are longstanding critiques of specific formalisation processes,3 our focus is on reconsidering 
the concept of ‘formalisation’ more broadly and highlighting cross-cutting issues in the way 
that formalisation is often approached.  
We argue that the concept of formalisation that is commonly used is fundamentally flawed. 
In contrast to its common usage, ‘formalisation’ does not describe a distinct phenomenon, 
but a set of diverse processes relating to the creation of new institutional linkages between 
state or formal economic structures and individuals or businesses.4 As we will show, 
however, the term is conventionally used to describe and compare, as if they were 
 
1  For reviews and meta-analyses of this expansive literature, see for example Bruhn and McKenzie (2014); Floridi, 
Demena and Wagner (2020). Where it is motivated in part by a desire to widen the tax base, policy enthusiasm seems 
likely to increase to address fiscal shortfalls resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic (Gallien and van den Boogaard 2021 
forthcoming). 
2  Estimates suggest that between one-third and two-thirds of economic activity is informal in developing economies (see 
e.g. Schneider and Enste 2000; Perry et al. 2007; La Porta and Shleifer 2008). The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) estimates that two billion workers – over 60 per cent of the global labour force – are employed informally 
(ILO 2018).  Hernando de Soto (2003) famously estimated that $9.3 trillion worth of assets, land in particular, are held 
informally. In many LMICs, the majority of businesses are estimated to be unregistered with revenue authorities. Of 
course, informality is not limited to lower-income countries (see Ulyssea 2020). 
3  See for example Moore (2020) on taxpayer registration; Joshi, Prichard and Heady (2014) on taxing the informal 
economy; Benda-Beckmann (2003) on titling; and Dolan and Rajak (2016) on formalisation at the ‘bottom of the 
pyramid’. 
4  Formal economic structures are non-state institutions that are structured and regulated through state institutions. 
Examples include central banks, chambers of commerce, or bonds.   
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analogous, a set of distinct processes and widely varying and heterogeneous subsets of 
relationships between states, businesses, and households. In particular, common 
approaches to formalisation are often rooted in three conceptual fallacies: a binary 
distinction between formal and informal economic actors, a conception of these informal 
actors as functionally homogenous, and the idea that ‘becoming’ formal necessarily creates 
a range of positive externalities. Fundamentally, all three are based on spurious 
assumptions which emerge from insufficient attention to contextual complexity and the 
political and social dynamics that shape informality in a given context. These have direct 
consequences for the suggested benefits of ‘formalisation’ for policymakers, individuals, and 
firms. 
We further argue that the persistent popularity of formalisation policies, despite disappointing 
empirical outcomes, can in part be understood through the structures and power dynamics 
of knowledge creation and policymaking in LMICs. In particular, the influence of some 
international and private sector actors in low-income countries has led to the dominance of 
an apolitical, high-level, and technocratic conception of formalisation that often fails to 
appreciate the complex empirical realities of informality and policy implementation. 
Fundamentally, we call for a re-conceptualisation of formalisation as a set of processes that 
are conditional, relational, and deeply political. Based on this, we outline new questions and 
methodological approaches that may help develop a better understanding of informality and 
formalisation processes across LMICs. This includes collaborative and interdisciplinary work 
that is suited to both recognising the distinct contexts of formalisation processes and 
engaging with local knowledge production.  
The remainder of this paper is split into four sections. We first review the conceptual 
foundations of ‘formalisation’ and highlight three key fallacies that are often embedded in 
both academic and policy approaches to formalisation. We then illustrate how these 
conceptual issues manifest in theory and practice by reviewing literature and policy impact 
evaluations relating to two specific formalisation processes: tax registration and land titling. 
While ‘formalisation’ encompasses a diverse range of activities and policies, analyses of 
these two policy areas provide particularly illustrative examples of the ways in which flawed 
conceptual foundations can limit the utility of theoretical frameworks of formalisation, while 
also drawing attention to common conceptual patterns across diverse and often unrelated 
policy areas.5 Having reviewed patterns in the conceptual foundations and the related, often 
disappointing, policy outcomes of tax registration drives and land titling programmes, we 
then show how the dynamics of knowledge creation and policymaking in low-income 
countries have nevertheless led to considerable policy and academic enthusiasm for 
formalisation. We conclude by arguing for a re-conceptualisation of formalisation and 
outlining the features of new research and policy agendas.  
 
5   These reviews of specific policy areas offer illustrative examples of the ways in which flawed conceptual foundations 
lead to spurious theoretical expectations, while reflecting broader patterns that emerge with formalisation policies 
across sectors. Given the diversity in how formalisation policies are applied, however, our scope is necessarily limited. 
We do not aim to provide a complete empirical review of the outcomes of formalisation policies across all sectors, 
contexts and policy areas – our focus here is conceptual, our empirical discussion primarily illustrative. There are also 
limitations in the cases we can cover; for example, while having profound policy impacts in the informal economy and 
sharing similarities with the theoretical and empirical patterns we describe, we only make limited references to the rich 
literature on social insurance and social protection policies, while acknowledging the scope for further engagement with 
this field. 
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1 Rethinking the conceptual foundations of 
‘formalisation’  
In the last few decades, writing on the politics, economics, and sociology of development 
and informal economies has often employed an increasingly expansionary use of the term 
‘formalisation’. Accounts of formalisation typically focus on the creation of new institutional 
linkages between state or formal economic structures and individuals or businesses. 
However, in any context such linkages, existing or potential, are numerous and diverse. One 
of the central conceptual issues in the use of the term ‘formalisation’ that we seek to 
highlight is that it is frequently used to describe and compare extremely diverse institutional 
linkages and processes across diverse contexts.6 Such diversity does not allow for simple 
comparative analysis or unconditional external validity (e.g. Lijphart 1971, 1975; Mill 1872). 
Consequently, de-contextualised inference across such different contexts has the potential 
to lead to spurious assumptions and conclusions. Analysts have nevertheless often used a 
broad conception of formalisation to directly compare analytically distinct processes, while 
too often making claims that findings about one type of process in one context will apply to 
distinct processes and contexts. Recent studies and meta-analyses of formalisation, for 
example, compare processes as distinct as titling of property, accessing public services, 
registering for taxpayer identification numbers or business licences, and paying taxes 
(e.g. De La O et al. 2021; Floridi, Demena and Wagner 2020). In turn, policymakers risk 
taking the lessons from studies of formalisation processes in a specific context and apply 
them to very different ones. Given the term’s application to diverse processes and contexts, 
it is unsurprising that there has been a substantive lack of clarity about its meaning, scope, 
and the assumptions embedded within it. We argue that the tendency to conflate different 
processes of formalisation is driven by three interrelated conceptual issues.  
First, through what we call a binary fallacy, there is a tendency to not fully appreciate the 
different ways in which individuals, businesses, and formal institutional structures interact, 
based on imprecise conceptions of both informality and what it means to ‘formalise’.7 A 
simple formal–informal duality is frequently assumed, in which firms are either fully ‘formal’ 
or fully ‘informal’, separated only by the specific institutional linkage that is the object of the 
study.8 As described in Table 1.1 (columns 1–3), however, different types of formalisation 
processes involve distinct institutional actors. Accordingly, firms and individuals in the 
informal economy may have a ‘formal’ relationship with one state actor (e.g. a public service 
provider) but not with another (e.g. the business licensing department of a municipal 
government). At the same time, economic actors may combine different activities through 
multiple jobs or seasonal labour that may straddle the formal and informal economy. A 
dichotomous view of formalisation obscures the myriad ways in which firms may straddle the 
formal–informal binary, including by having more formal relationships with some elements of 
 
6  While there are contexts in which using ‘formalisation’ as an umbrella term to describe a range of diverse processes 
can be analytically useful, as we argue in Section 4, this is not the typical usage in much of the literature today. 
7  One might add that there is a further fallacy following on from this one, namely the very conception of formality and 
informality as being fundamentally different, or formality being inherently more desirable or developmental. Prominent 
assumptions that formal institutions are inherently larger, more efficient, more complex, or are alone able to provide 
impersonal third-party enforcement have been increasingly criticised in recent years. Similarly, Legal Pluralist and 
Critical Institutionalist scholarship has argued that the common divided and hierarchical approach toward formality and 
informality is in itself more a result of the hegemonic discursive project of the state than of any inherent empirical 
feature of ‘formality’. For some discussions of this, see Meagher (2007); Gallien (2020a: Ch.2, 2020b); Mitchell (1991); 
Reyntjens (2016). While we do see these perspectives as capable of opening a further interesting discussion on 
formalisation, we do not discuss this here, as it goes beyond the scope and focus of this paper. 
8  This reflects broader, and well documented, issues with the concept of informality itself. For instance, Kanbur (2009: 2) 
notes that the term ‘informality’ ‘has the dubious distinction of combining maximum policy importance and political 
salience with minimal conceptual clarity and coherence in the analytical literature’ (see also Hart 2009; Banks, Lombard 
and Mitlin 2020). 
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the state and less formal ones with others (Meagher 2007, 2013; Roitman 2004; Titeca and 
Flynn 2014; Ulyssea 2018; Maloney 1999).9  Nevertheless, it is common for studies to define 
informality as an ‘all or nothing’ category or to treat the nature of one type of relationship as 
being representative of constitutive features of the firm or individual.10  
Second, and related to this binary view of informality, there is often a broader lack of 
appreciation of the diversity within the informal economy. When discussing formalisation, 
policymakers, administrators, and analysts often make certain assumptions about what 
characterises an informal firm, often settling on the image of a small, poor firm, or self-
employed trader or vendor.11 We call this the homogeneity fallacy. While the informal 
economy certainly includes small and micro firms and self-employed entrepreneurs, this 
does not accurately represent the breadth of firms that are not formally registered or paying 
taxes (see e.g. Joshi et al. 2014: 1328). The informal economy includes large operators and 
their dependent contractors – for example, supermarket chains, software distributors, 
auto-parts suppliers, consumer-electronics assemblers, and labour-intensive manufacturing 
(Farrell 2006) – as well as high-income earning self-employed professionals, such as 
lawyers, dentists, and accountants (Keen 2012; Ogembo 2020). Own-account operators, 
small firms with few employees, and large networks of informal subcontractors naturally are 
all very different economic agents. And yet, as we will show, approaches to formalisation 
often assume that the basic description of a ‘firm’ or ‘entrepreneur’ applies more or less 
uniformly across informal economic activity. But for many informal economic actors, the most 
fitting analogy is not the frequently employed imagery of small start-ups – innovative, risk-
taking, and growth-oriented – but that of employed workers, or even non-market care 
relationships. Importantly, without accounting for the diversity of informal economic activity 
and actors, analysts and policymakers are prone to make flawed assumptions about the 
reasons why actors remain informal in a given context and are likely to perceive informality 
exclusively as a voluntary choice following a cost-benefit calculation.12 Consequently, they 
risk mischaracterising the potential benefits of and barriers to formalisation for them, as well 
as mis-targeting formalisation policies.   
Third, there is an evolutionary fallacy embedded within many academic and policy 
approaches to thinking about formalisation. That is, there a tendency to assume that from 
the creation of one type of linkage with formal institutional structures, the formalisation of 
other linkages will naturally or logically follow, as well as a tendency to assume that positive 
externalities will naturally follow from an informal actor formalising their relationship with one 
type of institutional actor. Based on the binary view of informality discussed above, this 
fallacy imagines that ‘formalisation’ involves a switch-like change from an ‘informal’ status, 
with all the features usually associated with it (e.g. tax evasion, lack of access to public and 
financial services, avoidance of sanitary, health, and safety regulations, etc.) to a ‘formal’ 
 
9  This point has become even more important in the past few decades as the ways in which firms and individuals interact 
with different formal authorities have multiplied in part as a result of increased state capacity to make individuals and 
businesses legible, including through school records, electricity billing, and digital IDs.  
10  For example, a recent World Bank study in Mozambique defines a business as ‘formal’ only if it has an operating 
licence from the municipality, a business registration certification from a national registry of legal entities, and a 
taxpayer identification number (Jolevski and Aga 2019) 
11  This is reflected in the tendency to use ‘species classification techniques’ to predict a firm’s formal status according to 
other characteristics, including location of operation, gender, age, education, sector, length of business operations, 
connection to the electricity network, number of employees, use of accounting practices, advertising, amount of sales 
and profit, bank account ownership, and tax payment (Benhassine et al. 2018: Appendix p. 22; see also de Mel, 
McKenzie and Woodruff 2010). This is in line with a definition which defines ‘informality’ according to firms’ productive 
characteristics, rather than their adherence to regulations (see e.g. Fields 1990; Perry et al. 2007; Gasparini and 
Tornarolli 2009). 
12  Ulyssea (2020: 534) usefully points out that different views on why firms are informal are often seen as competing 
explanations of informality, though in reality simply reflect the different reasons why heterogeneous firms may have 
different incentives and interests in formalising or staying informal. He also draws attention to issues stemming from a 
dualistic view of informality and the informal economy, showing that formal and informal firms coexist and act in similar 
ways.  
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status, with all the ostensibly associated features (e.g. tax payment, access to public and 
financial services, compliance with regulations, etc.). Thus, as summarised in Table 1.1, and 
further illustrated in the review of common approaches to tax registration and property titling 
below, there is a tendency to assume that a specific formalisation process (e.g. tax 
registration) will also lead to another (e.g. use of formal banking), while also naturally leading 
to positive externalities (e.g. access to public services, better business performance). This is 
the case even where the process (here, registration) does not address the underlying 
structural barriers for the assumed outcomes (in this example, a need for greater collective 
action and taxpayer engagement to hold governments to account for new tax revenues). 
Naturally, these structural barriers depend on the nature of the institutional processes in 
question and on the broader context within which those processes take place, while the 
hoped-for outcomes are unlikely to materialise unless these barriers are addressed, despite 
assumptions that one process will follow another. In other words, while the policy process 
may be relatively easy to define and implement, the potential benefits are far from 
guaranteed. While many policy approaches are aimed at removing barriers to 
formalisation,13 they often do not focus on ensuring that the secondary outcomes are 
achieved.  
As a result of these three conceptual issues, assumptions about the dynamics and benefits 
of specific formalisation processes tend to be conceptually flawed. Consequently, 
comparisons across diverse types of formalisation processes can be all the more 
problematic. Nevertheless, as described in Table 1.1 (columns 4–5), empirical studies have 
a tendency to make similar assumptions about the benefits and secondary effects of 
developing new relationships with formal institutional structures, regardless of the diversity of 
those processes or the diversity of the contexts within which they are being implemented. 
These conceptual problems are not merely theoretical or abstract in nature but have led to 
the emergence of ‘conventional wisdom’ about formalisation and its benefits that is, we 
argue, often spurious, yet widely embraced by policymakers, particularly in LMICs. 
Consequentially, the assumed benefits and positive externalities of formalisation have too 
often been taken as accepted wisdom, with policymakers undertaking efforts to ‘formalise’ 
the informal economy, with grand hopes of what will follow. In the following section, we 
consider how these conceptual issues manifest through an exploration of two specific 
formalisation processes, showing that flawed conceptual foundations need to be 
reconsidered both when comparing across different forms of formalisation and when 
considering specific formalisation processes. 
 
13  This is, for example, at the heart of the World Bank’s Doing Business project (see e.g. World Bank 2020) and 
widespread initiatives to create ‘one-stop shops’ for business registration, typically for an operating licence and a 
taxpayer identification number. This is based on the influential argument of Hernando de Soto (1989) that informal firms 
would like to be formal but costly regulations and bureaucracy prevent them from doing so. 
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Table 1.1 Examples of the diversity of processes commonly encompassed by the term ‘formalisation’ 





Possible locus of new 
institutional relationship 
Common assumptions about why  
actors are informal 
Common assumptions about the benefits of formalisation  
(primary and secondary effects)14 
Registration for taxpayer 
identification number 





• Intentional tax evasion 
• Lack of knowledge about registration 
processes or the need to register 
• Lack of knowledge of the costs and 
assumed benefits 
• High direct and indirect costs of 
registration 
 
• Increased tax morale 
• Increased tax compliance 
• Increased tax revenues for the state 
• Increased tax enforcement 
• Greater fairness in the tax system 
• Increased civic and political participation 
• More accountable and responsive tax system 
• Increased business performance 
• Increased business investment 
• Increased adoption of professional business practices 
• Increased banking 
• Increased credit access 
• Increased access to public services 
• Decreased reliance on non-public providers of services 
• Decreased reliance on social intermediaries (e.g. market 
associations) 




Revenue authority  
• Lack of information about how to pay 
• Lack of information about benefits of 
paying 
• Barriers to payment 
• Overdue payments 
• Lack of service provision 
• Improved services 
• Increased access to services 
• Greater fairness in the tax system 
• Increased civic and political participation 
• More accountable and responsive tax system 
• Increased trust and confidence in government 
• Increased belief in government’s right to collect tax 
• Increased belief in service capacity of government 
• Increased belief in enforcement capacity of government 
• Increased satisfaction with government 
• Increased beliefs that others will pay 
• Increased overall tax morale  
• Decreased reliance on social intermediaries 
Registration for business 
operating permit 
Firms Municipal government  • Do not comply with the same rules that 
formal firms comply with  
• Not covered by the same rules 
• Off books, to avoid tax 
• Avoid government observation 
• Increased tax revenues for the state 
• Greater fairness in the tax system 
• More accountable and responsive tax system 
• Increased access to public services  
• Decreased reliance on non-public providers of services,  
• Increased access to credit 
 
14  Compiled from cited studies. Not all studies include all assumptions; rather, this column is a compilation of expectations found across multiple studies tracking similar types of formalisation processes in different 
contexts. 
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• Escape exploitative relationships with formal institutions 
• Increased legal protection 
• Increased investment and economic growth 
Registration for import 
licence 
Firms  • Informal firms are likely to avoid 
export/import activities  
• Likely to be foreign owned  
• Likely to be a large firm size  
• Likely to be more capital intensive 
• Decreased tax evasion 
• Decreased smuggling 
• Decreased illegal activities 
• Increased overall tax morale 
• Improved business performance  
• Improved access to markets  
• Improved access to finance  
Compliance with health/ 
sanitation regulations 
Firms Health department, labour 
department, municipal 
government  
• Avoid government observation • Enhanced safety standards 
• Improved work environment for workers 
Compliance with labour/ 
safety regulations 
Firms International conventions, 
national labour regulations 
• Informal workers are assumed to be 
outside the scope of labour standards 
• Same regulations are not relevant to 
informal enterprises  
• Avoid government detection  
• Workers without a contract 
• Workers outside the purview of labour 
regulations 
• Enhanced dispute resolution  
• Increased bargaining power  
• Increased collective action  
• Increased labour standards 
• Increased wages 
Property titling Households, firms Provincial/municipal government 
(surveying department) 
• Lack of information about titling 
processes 
• Lack of information about benefits of 
titling 
• High transaction costs 
• Increased security in property rights 
• Improved access to credit and financial services 
• Positive effect on investment in plots 
• Positive effects on titled property values 
• Improved land productivity 
• Positive income effects 
• Decreased expropriation risk 
• Negative effect on fertility 
• Positive effect on investment in human capital 
• Increase in trust, individualism, materialism 
• Decrease in social norms of sharing 
• Substitution of child labour by adult labour 
• Increased household labour supply 
• Increased migration away from household 
• Increased status and social network of title owners 
• Increased envy by non-titled neighbours 
• Increased usage of formal conflict resolution, crowding out traditional 
forms of conflict resolution 
• Less investment in non-state sectors (financial contributions to 
churches, funerals, weddings; participation in neighbourhood public 
goods provision; activities organised by local leaders) 
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• Increased demand for other types of formalisation (market permits, 
drivers’ licences, voter identification cards) 
• Improved evaluations of governments 
• Increased political participation 
• Increased sense of citizenship 
• Increased gender equity in property ownership 
• Improved health and education outcomes 
• Increased tax revenues for local government  




Public service provider 
(electricity, water, etc.) 
• Limited incentives for bureaucrats to 
provide services 
• Limited state revenues 
• Rent-seeking/corruption 
• Logistical and administrative 
impediments of access (bureaucratic 
navigation constraints) 
• High costs of access 
• Lack of information about eligibility 
requirements 
• Low education/limited language capacity 
• Increased satisfaction with government  
• Improved perceptions of government’s probity and effectiveness 
• Increased gratitude to the state 
• Improved perceptions of political efficacy 
• Increased tax morale 
• Increased tax compliance 
• Increased compliance with fees for other public goods 
• Increased expectation of punishment for non-compliance 
• Increased direct and indirect political engagement 
• Increased disposable income 
• Improved women’s empowerment 
• Improved women’s beliefs about women’s empowerment 
• Improved health and educational outcomes 
• Increased observance of duties and responsibilities as responsible 
and dutiful civic participants in the democratic process 
Relocation of market 
vendors to regulated 
market spaces 
Firms Municipal corporation  • Occupying spaces illegally  
• Public space obstruction 
• Lack of public hygiene and security 
 
• Improved working spaces 
• Improved public spaces 
• Economic empowerment  
• Better access to market facilities 
Financial inclusion Individuals, firms Provincial government, private 
actors 
• Rely on informal credit 
• Economically excluded and marginalised 
segments of population 
• Low collateral potential 
• Avoid tax payments 
• Avoid social contributions 
• Assumed unproductive  
• Increased productivity 
• Enhanced working capital potential 
• Increased financial connection to the formal system 
• Increased wage payments  
• Access to social benefits 
• Increased profitability 
• Reduced information asymmetries 
• Enhanced transparency  
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2 Linking conceptual foundations to empirical 
outcomes 
As described in the previous section, the term ‘formalisation’ is commonly used to refer to a 
variety of different processes, with analysts often insufficiently scrutinising the conceptual 
foundations upon which their hypotheses are developed. This conceptual vagueness is also 
prevalent within more specific formulations of formalisation. We illustrate this through an 
exploration of academic and policy approaches to two types of formalisation processes that 
have been particularly prominent: tax registration and property titling. Despite variation in the 
nature of the processes and relevant actors, we identify a parallel trend in both cases. Poorly 
conceptualised notions of formalisation, characterised by the three issues that we identified 
in Section 1, have frequently underpinned analyses and led to optimistic projections about 
anticipated outcomes of formalisation processes. As a result of the flawed underlying 
conceptualisation, theorised outcomes often do not materialise in practice – calling into 
question the value of the underlying theories.15  
2.1 Business registration for tax purposes 
An often-used indicator of ‘formalisation’ is the registration of businesses for tax purposes. 
Despite the diversity of informal firms, tax registration processes, and the formal institutional 
structures involved, studies of diverse registration processes often share similar theoretical 
grounding and hypotheses. These include at least three common assumptions. First, tax 
registration is often expected to lead to revenue gains from newly registered firms and from 
spillover effects resulting from more positive perceptions of horizontal equity within the tax 
system (Alm, Martinez-Vasquez and Wallace 2005; Araujo-Bonjean and Chambas 2005; 
Brockmeyer et al. 2019; Christensen and Garfias 2019; De La O et al. 2021; De Mel, 
McKenzie and Woodruff 2013; Giorgi, Ploenzke and Rahman 2018).16 Second, the logic of 
devoting policy resources to register taxpayers is often grounded in the perception that 
informal firms are tax evaders that are not paying their ‘fair share’ and are detracting from 
the overall equity of the tax system (e.g. La Porta and Schleiffer 2008; Turnovsky and 
Basher 2009; Saracoglu 2008).17 Third, academic and policy approaches are often driven by 
optimistic assumptions about the positive externalities of tax registration for the state and 
firms alike (see e.g. Bachas, Kondylis and Loeser 2021). It is often assumed that registering 
with state authorities and paying taxes or business licences will not only increase 
government revenue and fairness, but also increase civic and political participation and 
access to public services (see De La O et al. 2021; Gottlieb, LeBas and Obikili 2019), as well 
as leading to a range of other firm-level benefits, including reduced extortion, increased 
business performance and investment, increased adoption of ‘professional business 
practices’, and increased use of formal financial services, including banking and credit (e.g. 
Benhassine et al. 2018; Christensen and Garfias 2019).18 In line with our central argument, 
 
15  We identify conceptual trends in common approaches to formalisation, though do not mean to imply that formalisation 
policies will always lead to negative outcomes. Indeed, there is some evidence that formalisation policies that are more 
centrally focused on providing benefits directly to individuals and businesses – rather than hoping that those benefits 
will follow from more punitive measures – can have greater success, in part because they do not assume an 
evolutionary logic of formalisation, while often being more grounded in understandings of the political and structural 
constraints to accessing benefits in practices. The literature on social assistance and social protection provides a good 
source of examples for these dynamics. 
16  This latter outcome is based on the assumed link between horizontal equity and tax morale (e.g. Cummings et al. 2005; 
Torgler 2004, 2005). 
17  As described by Bahl (2005: 343) the fact that ‘the informal sector…may escape taxation… creates a major unfairness 
in taxation, introduces a sense that non-compliance is acceptable behavior, erodes confidences in the tax system and 
forces up effective rates on those who do pay income taxes.’ 
18  These ideas largely emerge out of the work of de Soto (1989), who argues that informality is costly for firms as it affects 
their ability to access bank financing, public contracts, or government programmes that may increase productivity.  
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however, we cannot assume that different processes of registration involving different types 
of firms, sectors, institutions, and political economic contexts will lead to the same outcomes. 
It follows that the theoretical promises of benefits often do not materialise in practice: 
revenue is often much more limited than expected, outcomes are often unfair, and links to 
greater accountability and other firm-level benefits often do not materialise (Moore 2020; 
Joshi et al. 2014; Gallien et al. 2021; Pimhidzai and Fox 2012; Rogan 2019; Bruhn and 
McKenzie 2014). As we argue below, some of the disappointing outcomes are rooted in 
broader issues with how formalisation processes and the informal economy are 
conceptualised in this policy area. 
2.1.1 Binary fallacy: What does it mean to register for tax payment? 
A binary view of informality can lead to a misrepresentation of the relationships between tax 
registration and its expected benefits in at least two ways. First, conceptual ambiguities 
about the meaning of ‘informality’ and ‘tax registration’ in a given context can lead observers 
to draw false equivalencies between diverse registration processes and contexts. In reality, 
tax registration encompasses diverse types of interaction between businesses and the state. 
Some recent studies of formalisation as registration, for example, consider registration as 
firms (of various sizes and types) through a highly heterogeneous set of processes: 
obtaining a business licence with local chambers of commerce or municipal governments 
(Christensen and Garfias 2019; Lenz et al. 2019; Kaplan et al. 2011; Mullainathan and 
Schnabl 2010; Alcázar, Andrade and Jaramillo 2010), registering with a registrar of legal 
entities, of businesses, or of microenterprises (Lenz et al. 2019; Rocha, Ulyssea and 
Rachter 2018; De Giorgi and Rahman 2013); obtaining a taxpayer identification number or 
otherwise registering for tax purposes (Gottlieb et al. 2019; De Mel et al. 2013); registering at 
a ‘one-stop shop’ encompassing multiple government agencies or obtaining both a business 
licence and a taxpayer identification number (Benhassine et al. 2018; De Andrade, Bruhn 
and McKenzie 2016; Bruhn and McKenzie 2013; Bruhn 2011; Kaplan, Piedra and Seira 
2011; Cárdenas and Rozo 2007; Bruhn 2011); or registering with multiple government 
agencies and receiving multiple licences and certificates (Lenz et al. 2019; Campos, 
Goldstein and McKenzie 2015; Fajnzylber, Maloney and Montes-Rojas 2011).19  Clearly, tax 
registration does not mean any one thing, even to those who study it. While often treated as 
equivalent, business registration and registration for a taxpayer identification number are not 
the same, and business registration does not necessarily lead to taxpayer registration 
(Campos et al. 2015). In practice, firms can be registered with some government agencies, 
but not others, and can have operating licences with the municipality but not be registered 
with the national revenue authority. Meanwhile, formally registered firms can evade taxes by 
underreporting revenues, implying partial compliance with formal tax rules (Ulyssea 2020: 
526). It follows that registering firms with a particular government agency does not ‘do’ any 
one thing or solve any single ‘problem’. 
Second, academic and policy approaches to tax registration often assume a binary definition 
of tax payment: firms either pay all of the taxes and dues they owe or they are evading 
taxes. As noted, the logic of devoting policy resources to register taxpayers is often 
grounded in the perception that informal firms are tax evaders (e.g. La Porta and Schleiffer 
2008; Turnovsky and Basher 2009; Saracoglu 2008; Gërxhani 2004; Hussmanns 2004; 
Mitra 2017). This view, however, often fails to appreciate the complexity of what it means to 
be ‘informal’. In particular, the assumption that ‘formalising’ unregistered firms will strengthen 
horizontal equity is problematic as informal firms are not necessarily tax evaders. A growing 
body of research shows that informal firms and informal workers already pay a wide range of 
 
19  Campos et al. (2015), for instance, consider formalisation as registering a business with the Department of the 
Registrar’s General, obtaining a Business Registration Certificate, obtaining a taxpayer identification number with the 
national revenue authority, and obtaining an operating licence with the municipality. Lenz et al. (2019), meanwhile, 
conceptualise formalisation as self-employed and micro-entrepreneurs obtaining a microenterprise certificate through 
the ‘microbusiness portal’ and the national register of legal entities, as well as obtaining an operating licence through 
the municipal government.  
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indirect taxes, nuisance taxes, user fees, and informal taxes (Araujo-Bonjean and Chambas 
2005; Joshi et al. 2014; Meagher 2018; Paler et al. 2017; Resnick 2020; Rogan 2019; van 
den Boogaard, Prichard and Jibao 2019; Moore, Prichard and Fjeldstad 2018; Pimhidzai and 
Fox 2012; Keen 2012; Evans, Harkness and Salomon 2020). At the same time, firms may 
pay taxes to a government agent without being registered with the municipal government or 
revenue authority, as often happens through presumptive or associational taxation 
(Benhassine et al. 2018: Appendix 3; Bird and Wallace 2005; Dube and Casale 2016; Joshi 
et al. 2014; Thuronyi 2005; Workneh and Mulugeta 2019), or may pay to one government 
agency but not to another. Rather than not paying their ‘fair share’, in many contexts informal 
firms already pay high and often regressive burdens  –  of both formal and informal 
payments  – to finance local public goods, to operate their business, or to avoid harassment 
by state or non-state actors. Where new taxes are levied on informal firms, there is nothing 
to suggest that existing formal and informal burdens will lighten, leading to what Rogan 
(2019) calls an ‘over-taxation of the most vulnerable’. 
2.1.2 Homogeneity fallacy: Where is the missing goldmine? 
Approaches to tax registration are often characterised by a lack of appreciation of the 
diversity of the informal economy or overly simplistic characterisations of informal 
businesses and their motivations and rationale for being informal. Critically, this can lead to 
inefficiently targeted registration drives that limit their effectiveness,  with poorly targeted 
strategies often being costly to implement, limiting their revenue efficiency (Brockmeyer et al. 
2019; Dube 2014; Lediga, Riedel and Strohmaier 2020; Tripp 1989; Ulyssea 2018). 
Critically, while it has been well documented that there is considerable revenue potential of 
taxing large firms and high-income individuals within the informal economy (see e.g. Tripp 
1989; Ogembo 2020; Kangave et al. 2016; Keen 2012), many formalisation strategies have 
instead focused on registering smaller firms, despite the reality that many smaller informal 
operators, and in particular own-account workers, often operate below tax payment 
thresholds.20 Benhassine et al. (2018) show that, perhaps unsurprisingly, the cost of a 
broadly focused registration campaign in Benin exceeded the expected tax revenues that 
newly registered firms would pay in the next decade. Where registration drives have shown 
more promising results in terms of cost-effectiveness (Jouste, Nalukwago and Waiswa 
2021), it is not clear if the full costs of registration are being taken into account, including 
costs to agencies other than revenue authorities, costs to taxpayers, and additional costs to 
revenue authorities of processing more tax returns and collections.21 Accordingly, poorly 
targeted registration drives, based in a lack of appreciation for the diversity of the informal 
economy, often fail to capture the frequently promised ‘missing goldmine’ of the informal 
economy (Monye and Abang 2020). Relatedly, though registering new taxpayers is often 
assumed to lead to secondary revenue gains by increasing horizontal equity in the tax 
system – which is theorised to be linked to greater tax morale – it is unlikely to lead to 
positive equity outcomes unless it explicitly targets high-income earners  (Araujo-Bonjean 
and Chambas 2005; Bahl 2005; Kangave et al. 2016; Kangave et al. 2018; Ogembo 2020) 
and is thus unlikely to lead to positive secondary revenue outcomes.22  Overall, instead of 
 
20  This mistargeting may in part be a result of studies showing that the share of informal firms declines as firms grow 
larger (e.g. Perry et al. 2007; De Paula and Scheinkman 2011).  And as Keen (2012: 15) notes, ‘the optimal tax to be 
remitted by [many micro and small enterprises] themselves may very well be zero’, thus emphasising the need to 
‘[weigh] the revenue foregone by excluding them from tax against the administrative and compliance costs… from 
including them’. For example, an informal domestic worker working full-time at minimum wage in South Africa earns 
approximately half of the minimum threshold for paying income tax to the South African Revenue Authority (Rogan 
2019: 3). If the targets of a registration drive are small low-income firms, ‘new’ taxpayers may fall under income tax 
thresholds or qualify for VAT exemptions, thus not leading to tax revenues (and, given the costs of registering 
taxpayers, may actually lead to net revenue losses). 
21  We are grateful to Mick Moore for drawing our attention to the ways in which the full costs of registration programmes 
may not be captured within analyses by revenue authorities. 
22  Indeed, it is not clear why we should we expect individuals to be more motivated to pay tax where the government 
targets small informal firms for tax payment, regardless of the fairness of the overall tax system, including the treatment 
of larger evaders. 
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targeting revenue maximisation efforts based on informality, policymakers should focus on 
‘the real issue’ of non-compliance (Keen 2012: 16; Moore 2020). 
2.1.3 Evolutionary fallacy: Where are the expected positive externalities of tax 
registration? 
Academic and policy ideas around business registration for tax purposes are often based on 
the expectation that registration will lead not only to increased tax revenues but also to 
increased access to public services, and other firm-level benefits (Figure 2.1). As noted, 
these hoped-for outcomes often do not materialise, in part because the evolutionary fallacy 
that is at the heart of these approaches has a direct impact on policy outcomes around tax 
registration.  
Figure 2.1 Commonly assumed causal chains catalysed by tax registration 
 
First, while tax revenue gains are central to the rationale for tax registration policies, a 
growing body of empirical evidence shows that these imagined revenue gains are far from 
guaranteed. Though registering for a business licence often comes with costs, implying 
some (non-tax) revenue gains to the state, studies show that firms often need incentives in 
order to register, with the threshold of those incentives sometimes wiping out any revenue 
gains (Bruhn and McKenzie 2014), while revenue gains are likely to be temporary when tied 
to one-time and short-term incentives (e.g. Galiani 2017; Mullainathan and Schnabl 2010).23 
More fundamentally, it is often assumed that registering for a business licence or with the tax 
authority will lead to tax revenue gains. Even when tax registration drives are well targeted 
and focus on firms above revenue thresholds, they do not necessarily lead to tax payment or 
compliance. In contrast to the evolutionary logic embedded within many registration policies, 
a growing body of evidence  makes clear that an increase in registered taxpayers does not 
inherently lead to a proportional increase in tax revenues (e.g. Santoro and Mdluli 2019; 
Santoro et al. 2020; Lediga et al. 2020; Moore 2020; Mascagni et al. 2020; Mayega et al. 
2019; Ligomeka 2019; Mascagni and Mengistu 2016; Almunia et al. 2017; Keen 2012; 
Gauthier and Gersovitz 1997; Gauthier and Reinikka 2001; Hoy, McKenzie and Sinning 
2020).24  
Second, approaches to formalisation commonly assume that some benefits are inherent to 
the process, irrespective of the resulting tax revenue. Here, formality itself is inherently 
viewed as a desirable outcome by addressing ‘unfair’ competition between formal and 
informal firms, providing benefits to newly formalised firms, and raising overall tax morale by 
increasing horizontal equity in the tax system. However, the validity of these assumptions is 
 
23  Indeed, high-cost interventions, subsidies, or benefits of registration may only be temporary, particularly where tax 
registration is linked to temporary public goods access. For instance, in Lagos state, parents’ tax registration and 
payment are necessary for their children to go to government-run secondary schools (Gottlieb et al. 2019), though there 
is nothing to ensure that individuals stay registered once their children leave school – or even to remain registered and 
tax compliant throughout the school year. More generally, attempts to induce formalisation through incentives or policy 
reforms may not have long-lasting effects as many licensing records are provisional, having to be periodically renewed 
(see e.g. Mullainathan and Schnal 2010). 
24  Reviewing evidence from six countries, Moore (2021) estimates that more than half of taxpayers registered with 
national tax administrations do not pay taxes at all. For example, in Rwanda in 2017, about 56 and 23 per cent of 
corporate and personal income tax declarations, respectively, were nil-filers (Mascagni et al. 2020). Despite being 




















highly context and sectorally dependent as different types and structures of firms are likely to 
see heterogeneous benefits through formalisation. In particular, while smaller firms are likely 
to be targeted by registration drives, they are also less likely to see the benefits of 
formalisation (see e.g. Bruhn and McKenzie 2014), raising questions about the logic of 
spending resources to try to draw them into the tax net. Moreover, while, as noted, it is often 
assumed that ‘widening the tax net’ through tax registration drives will have positive spillover 
effects on broader tax compliance or ‘tax culture’ in the short or long run, evidence that 
informality can lead to reduced tax morale or that it affects the broader culture of obeying the 
law is limited (e.g. Torgler and Schneider 2007; Bruhn and McKenzie 2014).25 Meanwhile, 
the ways in which taxpayers perceive, value, and prioritise horizontal versus vertical equity in 
the tax system may vary in different contexts. This leads us to question more broadly some 
of the assumptions that expanding the tax net through the formalisation of firms is inherently 
fair or socially optimal, particularly where tax drives are not well targeted. 
Third, other hypothesised positive externalities of tax registration for firms likewise often do 
not materialise in practice in part because these assumptions are based on a flawed 
evolutionary logic – what some may reasonably describe as ‘magical thinking’26 – that one 
type of formalisation (tax registration) will inherently lead to others (e.g. accessing formal 
financial services) and that positive development outcomes are a natural result of 
formalisation writ large (Figure 2.1). In practice, however, the act of registering with a 
specific government authority need not inherently change a firm’s relationship to formal 
financial service providers or to their own accounting books.27 Without addressing the 
underlying structural constraints limiting desired outcomes (use of formal banking, higher 
profits, etc.), positive externalities are unlikely to materialise. This is reflected in empirical 
outcomes, with studies indicating that the benefits to firms of formalising (in terms of 
increased, sales, profits, number of employees, etc.) are generally limited (Bruhn and 
McKenzie 2014; Ulyssea 2020; Benhassine et al. 2018; Rocha et al. 2018; De Mel et al. 
2013).28 Regardless of the causal chains that are commonly assumed to follow from tax 
registration (Figure 2.1), tax registration often achieves only one outcome: a larger, though 
not necessarily more accurate, list of prospective taxpayers. Relatedly, it is often assumed 
that registering with state authorities and paying taxes or business licences will not only 
increase government revenue and fairness, but also increase civic and political participation 
and access to public services (see De La O et al. 2021; Gottlieb et al. 2019). The belief that 
registration will lead to more accountable and responsive governments, however, requires 
two separate causal premises to be true: that taxpayer registration leads to tax payment and 
that tax payment leads to accountability (Figure 2.1).29 As described above, registration does 
not necessarily lead to tax payment. Meanwhile, literature on tax and accountability makes 
clear that taxation only leads to improved accountability under certain conditions, including 
where taxpayers have the motivation, resources, and power – the capacity for collective 
action – to make successful demands on governments for reciprocity  (Prichard 2015). 
 
25  There are well-established theoretical links between horizontal equity and tax morale, though broader understandings 
of the link between tax morale and tax compliance are increasingly questioned (Prichard forthcoming) – further 
suggesting that the secondary revenue gains implied by ‘widening the tax net’ through tax registration are unlikely to be 
significant. 
26  We would like to credit Mike Rogan for this term, who was kind enough to give comments on an earlier version of this 
paper.  
27  Benhassine et al. (2018), for instance, show that providing incentives (provision of business services and trainings, 
assistance in opening a bank account, tax preparation support, tax mediation services) can induce informal firms to 
register – though still at relatively small absolute levels – but do not lead to higher sales or profits for firms. 
28  While firm-level benefits often do not materialise, there is some evidence of positive aggregate effects, for example on 
total factor productivity (see Ulyssea 2020: 541–2 for a review of this literature). 
29  The link between tax and accountability is based on a contractual view of taxation, which has a simple logic: where 
individuals pay taxes, they are more likely to make demands of governments and where governments rely on tax 
revenues, they are more likely to be responsive to citizens (see e.g. Bräutigam 2002; Moore 2008; Prichard 2015).  
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Focusing just on increasing tax payment, rather than supporting these enabling conditions, is 
counterintuitive and possibly counterproductive.30  
These caveats to the promises of accountability outcomes are particularly important for two 
key reasons. First, while capacity for collective action is necessary for positive governance 
and accountability outcomes, organising and making demands of government is often 
particularly challenging for firms and workers in the informal economy.31 Although there is 
evidence of taxation spurring political activism among informal sector associations (Dube 
and Casale 2016), collective action among informal sector operators is typically low, while 
power inequities within informal trade associations can limit the inclusiveness and 
representativeness of the groups (Joshi and Ayee 2008; Lindell 2010; Meagher 2014). At the 
same time, governments in many contexts have long histories of attempting to curtal 
informal labour organisation (e.g. Tripp 1989). Second, in practice, registration drives are 
often primarily designed with a focus on revenue extraction, rather than on encouraging 
taxpayer engagement or delivering improved public goods. For example, many registration-
related ‘formalisation interventions’ focus on reducing the costs of formality (Ulyssea 2020) 
or giving firms information about registration processes, rather than on improving public 
services or benefits for firms.32 These interventions appear to rely on the assumption that 
information is sufficient to lead to registration and that registration is sufficient to spur 
bargaining processes that may, in turn, lead to improvements in public services. However, 
they do not actually address the fiscal social contract or underlying structural constraints to 
collective action. Instead, by predicating access to public goods on tax payment and tax 
bargaining, they put the burden on individuals and firms to do the work necessary to obtain 
access to basic public goods.33  It is thus unsurprising that the presumed accountability and 
governance benefits of registration often fail to materialise. 
2.1.4 Conceptual fallacies and technocratic tendencies  
Despite the lack of conceptual clarity at its foundation, tax registration of informal firms 
continues to be widely embraced by policymakers (see Moore 2020; Bruhn and McKenzie 
2015), supported by optimistic assumptions about the benefits and positive externalities for 
the state and firms alike. And regardless of their specious nature, the assumptions 
embedded within many approaches to tax registration have shaped the nature of policy 
recommendations and interventions. For example, from the assumption that registration is 
beneficial for firms has commonly followed the assumption that firms do not register either 
because they do not know how to do so, they are unaware of their obligation to do so, they 
are unaware of the benefits of doing so, or the direct and indirect costs of registering are too 
high (see Bruhn and McKenzie 2014). This has often lead to policy interventions that focus 
on providing potential taxpayers with the information they need to register or to lower the 
costs of registration, but have overwhelmingly found that providing information on 
registration or decreasing the upfront costs of registration have limited impact on registration 
 
30  Indeed, ‘without an environment that enables tax bargaining, there is a risk that taxation will amount to little more than 
forceful extraction’ (van den Boogaard et al. 2020: 8). After all, taxation is not an inherent good; it is ‘desirable only if 
governments translate additional public revenue into valuable goods and services that improve public welfare’ (Moore 
et al. 2018: 179). 
31  In Lusaka, for instance, Resnick (2020: 1065) finds that ‘collective action needs to mediate the taxation-representation 
linkage’ and that the capacity for effective collective action depends on the existence of common preferences among 
informal workers, as well as on the relative directness and transparency of the link between tax payment and service 
delivery. 
32  The logic of reducing the costs of informality is heavily influenced by the work of de Soto (1989) (see also Djankov et al. 
2002). When benefits are included as an incentive, they are often focused on reducing taxes (considered the ongoing 
costs of formality) (see e.g. De Mel et al. 2013; Rocha et al. 2018), rather than providing reciprocal services for those 
taxes. 
33  Critically, this raises further questions about who is deserving of or entitled to basic rights of citizenship (see e.g. 
McCarthy 2018). Proof of taxpayer registration or tax payment may problematically limit access to public goods for 
vulnerable populations, while the assumptions embedded within many approaches to formalisation imply additional 
burdens on individuals to access their rights  – that is, individuals not only have to pay tax, they also have to organise 
and spend scarce time and resources to hold their government authorities to account. 
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outcomes (Campos, Goldstein and McKenzie 2015; Christensen and Garfias 2019; De 
Giorgi and Rahman 2013; De Mel et al. 2013; Galiani, Meléndez and Ahumada 2017; Lenz 
et al. 2019), Grady et al. 2020; Bruhn 2011; Kaplan et al. 2011; Piza 2018).34 Where more 
positive results emerge (e.g. Benhassine et al. 2018; Rocha et al. 2018), the costs of the 
incentives required to induce registration often outweigh the returns.35 Among studies that 
focus on the impact of higher enforcement on registration outcomes (see e.g. D’Erasmo and 
Boedo 2012; Ordonez 2014; Ulyssea 2018, 2019), there are, critically, ‘no good estimates of 
implementation costs’ while evidence suggests that they are also not cost-effective (Ulyssea 
2020: 540). In practice, however, not registering may be a rational individual choice where 
the state provides nothing in return or where the positive externalities of registering are far 
from guaranteed (Maloney 2004). Therefore, and in line with the discussion above, no one 
should be surprised if interventions that are primarily informational fail to produce significant 
and sustainable outcomes in terms of revenue, equity, and accountability. 
This tendency towards technocratic ‘fixes’, meanwhile, likely reinforces disappointing 
empirical outcomes by failing to address political and other structural constraints to the 
desired benefits, whether in terms of revenue outcomes, distributional effects, public goods 
outcomes, or firm-level productivity gains. Indeed, contextual and political realities often 
militate against these outcomes. For instance, while registration is often embraced by 
policymakers and revenue administrators for a variety of reasons, in practice both revenue 
administrators and politicians may face weak incentives to implement registration policies 
even after they have been adopted. This further underpins the reality of the complex and 
multifaceted nature of relationships between informal firms and the range of actors and 
institutions that make up ‘the state’. A growing body of work, for instance, draws attention to 
the informal deals that may be made between the state and informal workers to limit taxation 
of the informal economy (Holland 2015; Joshi et al. 2014; Kapaz and Kenyon 2005; Tendler 
2002; Tripp 1989).36 At the same time, the often inefficient targeting of registration drives 
may in part reflect revenue administrators’ inclination to opt for simplicity rather than fairness 
(Engelschalk 2005),  administrative capacity constraints,37 and an often-overwhelming lack 
of political desire to target high net worth individuals through registration drives. Where 
visibility, accessibility, and politicisation of potential taxpayers underpins registration 
strategies, neither fairness nor revenue efficiency are ensured; where academic and policy 
approaches to registration focus on technocratic solutions rather than the institutional, 
political, and social context, they are unlikely to inform effective policy outcomes. We 
develop these ideas more systematically in Section 4.  
 
34  For meta-analyses of cost-reducing interventions that find their limited impact on outcomes, see Bruhn and McKenzie 
(2014) and Ulyssea (2020). Where interventions focus on improving the benefits of formalisation, they often do so in 
hypothetical terms only. For example, Lenz et al. (2019) hypothesise that positive outcomes will emerge where firms 
expect benefits to materialise (operationalised through messaging in a letter that focuses on the theoretical link 
between taxation and public goods outcomes), rather than where there are actual improved public goods. In such 
instances, it may be thus less surprising when the expected positive outcomes do not emerge (see e.g. Grady et al. 
2020). 
35  As summarised in a meta-analysis of economic studies of formalisation, ‘reducing the costs of entering the formal 
sector has very limited or no formalization effects, while reducing the ongoing costs of formality (or increasing its 
benefits) is more effective, but the effects are not large and the policies do not seem to be cost effective’ (Ulyssea 
2020: 533). 
36  As these studies highlight, politicians in many contexts rely on votes from the small-scale operators that dominate the 
economy, as well as themselves being deeply integrated within networks of high net worth individuals whose 
businesses may straddle formal–informal boundaries. 
37  For example, in some contexts, tax authorities may be more easily able to register and collect tax from informal workers 
in centrally located business districts and in sectors that are highly visible (see e.g. Morange 2015; Prichard and van 
den Boogaard 2017). Resnick (2020: 17) finds, for instance, that for informal business operators in council markets, ‘tax 
compliance decreases the further a respondent is from the CBD [central business district], which is where the human 
resources to collect revenue are more concentrated’. 
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2.2 Property titling 
As with the literature on tax registration, academic discussions around the effects of 
formalising property ownership – titling – have often been underpinned by conceptual and 
causal imprecision in their approach to formalisation but have nevertheless influenced policy 
discourse and practice. Indeed, arguments underpinning titling have ‘mesmerised’ policy 
makers (Cousins et al. 2005), even in the face of increasingly mixed and often highly 
unsystematic empirical evidence. As a substantive review of the literature on titling by 
Durand-Lasserve et al. (2007: 63) concludes, ‘land titling programmes have been promoted 
by a range of international development institutions and national governments for some 
years, despite the lack of independent empirical research to demonstrate that the claims 
made for them are achievable in practice’.  In part, this enthusiasm has been supported by 
the successful framing of titling as a ‘pro-poor’ property rights intervention (Musembi 2007). 
Providing an alternative to calls for wealth redistribution, dominant arguments about titling 
suggest that a substantial amount of wealth is already at the disposal of the poor. Vast 
swaths of ‘dead capital’, it is posited, merely need to be activated, providing ‘empowerment’ 
at almost no cost to the state or the wealthy (de Soto 1989, 2003).  While a full discussion of 
these dynamics goes beyond the scope of this paper, we briefly review key policy 
interventions and meta-analyses of titling programmes, showing that the premises upon 
which many approaches to titling are built share similarities with the approaches to tax 
registration discussed above, as well as to formalisation more broadly – and particularly the 
three wider conceptual issues we have outlined above. 
2.2.1 Binary fallacy: Formal and informal land 
At the heart of the more optimistic literature on titling stands a strong view about the 
characteristics of formally held property, perceiving a clear division between officially 
registered land and informally held land, in line with the ‘binary’ fallacy identified above. 
Notably, dominant views of titling have frequently been criticised for upholding a narrow and 
simplistic construction of legality (Musembi 2007), of the difference between ‘formally’ and 
‘informally’ held land, and of the diversity of each – with implications for the value of ‘dead 
capital’ that is estimated to exist.38 This manifests both in the assumption that certain 
features – such as security of property holdings, the ability to use property as collateral – are 
inherent in formally held property, and that they are largely absent in informally held 
property. This mirrors the highly binary and hierarchical conception of formal and informal 
that we discuss above. It ignores the benefits that informal property titles may in some cases 
convey to their holders. For example, as Woodruff (2001: 1219) notes in the context of 
Thailand, owners of untitled land may in fact be ‘likely to receive credit as are farmers with 
titled land, even from banks’. Critically, it also leaves little room for grey areas between these 
two categories, and, in particular, for the multiplicity of different forms of use and access to 
land and the messiness of different overlapping claims and uses that we often find in how 
people use land in practice.39  
As with approaches to tax registration, this view not only risks creating a simplistic dichotomy 
between the formal and informal but reduces a highly political and contested multiplicity of 
claims and relationships to a single, simple formal procedure. Consequently, approaches to 
titling not only simplify complex and contested claims but have been increasingly criticised 
for ‘[glossing] over unequal power relations that are behind the demands for property rights 
reform’ (Musembi 2007: 1459), as well as the social structures that these dynamics are 
embedded within (Benda-Beckmann 2003: 189). These include the power relationships 
 
38  For example, while formal property titles can theoretically refer to a variety of ownership relations, including communal 
property, there is a strong but frequently unstated assumption that formal ownership refers to exclusive private 
ownership for the purpose of capital generation (Benda-Beckmann 2003: 188–9). 
39  Legal pluralist scholarship has been particularly vocal in highlighting this point, see for example Nygren (2004); 
Benda-Beckmann (2003); Baaz, Lilja and Östlund (2017); Adler, Porter and Woolcock (2008). 
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between formal and informal property holders, the actual distributions of wealth that underlie 
property distribution, and the power of the state itself. This has, for example, been illustrated 
in debates around titling in relation to land-grabbing. While titling was originally often 
presented as a ‘formalisation fix’ (Dwyer 2015) to the problem of land-grabbing by assigning 
firm property rights, recent work has noted that through the selective and political application 
of titling, it can also in turn represent a means of land-grabbing by states or politically 
connected actors.40 As in the context of tax registration, the presentation of the state as a 
technocratic registry, rather than a political institutional structure, obscures dynamics that are 
critical to understanding informality. An apolitical framing of both titling processes and the 
state makes it easy to overlook the many reasons why people may resist formalisation 
programmes beyond their costs or administrative burdens.41  
This stark division between formally and informally held property has been a driver of one of 
the most famous and influential aspects of the pro-titling argument: the idea of ‘dead capital’ 
– vast swaths of informal property that can be made available to the market through a simple 
act of registration and can spur development. De Soto (2003) famously estimated the value 
at $9.3 trillion. However, this likely presents an overestimation of the world’s ‘dead capital’ by 
overestimating the amount of informally held property and, critically, its value, alongside its 
diversity and ‘liveliness’ (Woodruff 2001). In particular, it has increasingly been argued that 
the dominant literature pays insufficient attention to variation in land type – for example, 
grouping together agricultural land and street corners held by informal vendors – as well as 
the size or value of assets (Musembi 2007; Benda-Beckmann 2003). By focusing on the 
division in status rather than its wider distribution, the ‘dead capital’ argument also overlooks 
the fact that many holders of informal property are asset-poor. This leads directly to the 
following point. 
2.2.2 Homogeneity fallacy: Who benefits from titling programmes  
As noted above, titling has typically been framed as a ‘pro-poor’ intervention. In practice, 
however, titling programmes have frequently been associated with substantive equity issues 
and, as one set of authors has pointed out, have often actually ‘been shown to disadvantage 
the poor’ (Cousins et al. 2005: 2). Frequently, poor beneficiaries of titling programmes have 
been particularly vulnerable to distress sales and the dispossession of their properties, often 
to the benefit of political-economic elites at the local or national level (Anaafo and Guba 
2017; Benda-Beckmann 2003). Firmin-Sellers and Sellers’ (1999: 1118) seminal study of 
Cameroon's 1974 Lands Ordinance, for example, found that the majority of land titles were 
actually awarded to ‘state elites (politicians and bureaucrats) and businessmen’. We believe 
that the mismatch between the assumed and the real beneficiaries of titling programmes 
connects to a simplistic understanding of who holds informal property, what their motivations 
are, and the diverse contexts and power dynamics in which they are embedded. In order for 
some of the more bullish claims of the benefits of titling for development to work, what is 
required is a stylised picture of the beneficiary of titling programmes as households or 
entrepreneurs with informally held property, the (informal) claim to which is individual, 
uncontested, and valuable enough to support the necessary credit line, and a business that 
can be expanded through capital investment. As noted above, this set of conditions is rare – 
 
40  A full review of this discussion goes beyond the scope of this paper. For illustrative purposes, see for example recent 
discussions on the political context and implementation of titling in relation to land-grabbing in South-East Asia (Dwyer 
2015; Hirsch 2011) or, similarly, Anthias and Radcliffe (2015) on the titling of original communal lands in Bolivia.  
41  In addition to the concerns about inequity discussed above, individuals may perceive legitimate risks through land titling 
by being made more legible to states (see Scott 1992) or may fear that engaging with a new regulatory system 
controlled by the state makes them vulnerable to expropriation and dispossession to the benefit of politically connected 
elites (Mitchell 2002: 74). 
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and a more detailed look at the contested claims and power dynamics around informal 
property quickly leads to a more heterogeneous and context-specific picture.42  
More thorough investigations of the diversity of informal property holders require recognising 
the importance of local context in understanding the diverse motivations of targeted 
beneficiaries of titling programmes. On the one hand, recognising the value and appeal of 
informal markets for business operators (Musembi 2007: 1468), rather than assuming them 
to be non-existent or disorderly, helps us to understand what some beneficiaries of titling 
might be giving up by registering their property. In parallel, understanding local political and 
social contexts also highlights how formal systems themselves are embedded in them, and 
therefore can provide further explanations for the potential reluctance by some informal 
property holders to engage in formal systems that they do not perceive as legible, or as 
controlled by actors that are hostile to them (Mitchell 2009). This again connects to the point 
made in the case study above: the absence of a meaningful interrogation of the motives and 
perspectives of those affected by formalisation programmes as well as of formalisation 
programmes themselves as unpolitical and purely technical or legal ‘fixes’ gives rise to 
simplistic assumptions about their incentives and consequently simplistic policy discourses 
around ‘carrots and sticks’.43  
A more nuanced picture of the contexts and beneficiaries of titling programmes also reveals 
often starkly gendered outcomes. Even though gender equity is often pointed to as a 
potential social objective of titling programmes,44 a large number of case studies highlight 
the potential for titling programmes to reinforce women’s unequal  position with respect to 
tenure rights (Durand-Lasserve et al. 2007: 27). In Kenya, for example, the formalisation of 
land titles required an administrative simplification where there were multiple interests in land 
and, as a consequence, marginalised women’s traditional claims to properties at the 
expense of their husbands (Musembi 2007: 1470). In line with the discussion on 
‘technocratic fixes’ above, this provides another example where formalisation policies that do 
not recognise local context can deepen inequalities, even if they are not themselves 
discriminatory.  These dynamics once again highlight the importance of recognising titling – 
like formalisation more broadly – as a process that affects diverse groups differently, as a 
result of it being itself embedded in a political context, rather than being an apolitical or 
technocratic act. As Hendrix (1995: 183) notes, ‘the impact of land titling depends on many 
local factors such as custom, geography, resources, law, and history. A closer examination 
of empirical studies reveals a complex and nuanced reality with conditional or contingent 
impacts on economic growth.’ As in the discussion of tax registration above this does of 
course not imply that these policies can never create positive outcomes, but instead 
underlines the need for a conditional and context-dependent conceptualisation of 
formalisation, a point that we will focus on again in the conclusion.  
  
 
42  This point is highlighted by Kingwill et al. (2006: 13, cited in Durand-Lasserve et al. 2007): ‘“the poor” are not 
homogeneous and those in the extra-legal sector should be differentiated according to income and vulnerability status. 
Formalisation via title deeds may be affordable and appropriate for some, especially those who are upwardly mobile, 
but can have negative impacts on the security and well-being of the unemployed and other marginalised groupings’. 
43  Another notable feature of this is that many of these assumptions jump almost seamlessly from thinking of the 
beneficiaries of titling programmes as households, businesses, and ‘entrepreneurs’, again highlighting a very particular 
perspective on their livelihood strategies that is likely at odds with more diverse empirical realities.  
44  For a prominent example, see the titling programmes in Peru in the mid-1990s, of which Field (2003: 1) argues that ‘a 
stated objective of the programme was to improve gender inequality of property ownership by including female names 
on land titles’. 
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2.2.3 Evolutionary fallacy: Rethinking the positive externalities of titling 
As with tax registration processes, the policy appeal of titling programmes has often been 
rooted in the positive externalities assumed to follow from the formalisation of property. Once 
again, an evolutionary fallacy underpins assumptions that a range of positive outcomes will 
follow from the process of gaining a property title (Figure 2.2). As above, the fact that this 
conception is flawed does not mean that benefits are never forthcoming, but instead that 
they are not assured, often spurious, and are context dependent. Empirical evaluations of 
titling have provided a range of illustrations for this dynamic. For one, in contrast to central 
theoretical assumptions (Besley 1995; de Soto 1989), a significant body of evidence shows 
that titling does not necessarily lead to improved access to credit or increased use of titled 
land as collateral (Field and Torero 2006; Domeher and Abdulai 2012; Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2010). This includes findings from one of the most prominent large-scale 
studies of property titling, the Urban Property Rights Project in Peru, which, between 1996 
and 2003, issued property titles to over 1.2 million urban households, but led to no increase 
in the likelihood of title holders getting access to credit from private sector banks (Field and 
Torero 2006).45 Evidence for public sector loans was a little more positive, highlighting 
barriers within the banking sector as a critical hurdle to the suspected positive externality, as 
banks remain hesitant to provide loans even on titled property (ibid.). Some have traced this 
to commercial banks seeing the transaction costs of foreclosure as being too high, or that 
banks may see foreclosure as infeasible for political reasons (Deininger 2003). Drawing on 
experiences of titling in Kenya, Musembi (2007) shows that banks’ lending decisions are 
based not just on the formal status of the land but also on the value of property, while 
drawing attention to the reality that informal lending markets are often desirable creditors for 
holders of low-value property. Highlighting that the total value of the collateral, rather than 
just its formal or informal status, affects ability to access loans, Benda-Beckmann (2003: 
188) observes that ‘banks do not give credit to poor beggars or a mortgage on a slum 
dwelling located amongst thousand others’. Accordingly, without addressing the real barriers 
to accessing formal capital, the underlying evolutionary logic fails, as the formalisation of one 
type of relationship with the state (through titling) is unlikely to lead to the formalisation of 
other relationships (e.g. with formal sector banks) (Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.2 Commonly assumed causal chains catalysed by property titling 
 
 
45  A somewhat unexpected result of this study was that while access to credit did not increase with titling, there was a 
notable increase in hours worked and a shift in labour supply away from work at home (Field 2007), although the exact 





































Similarly, while a range of studies have shown that titling frequently raises the perception of 
property security, they have similarly noted that this might not itself trigger further 
developmental impacts such as higher investments in property (see e.g. Reerink and van 
Gelder 2010). This is in part because in various contexts informal arrangements may already 
provide sufficient property security for investment decisions (Durand-Lasserve and Royston 
2002; van Gelder 2007), legal status may not be a sufficient proxy for perceptions of the 
likelihood of eviction, or capital rather than perceptions of security dampen investment 
(Broegaard 2005). Accordingly, one thing need not lead to another, while context will also 
create differences and inequities between different groups of potential ‘recipients’(Broegaard 
2005; Reerink and van Gelder 2010).  As above, a tendency towards technocratic policy 
interventions often leads to disappointing outcomes when they do not address the real 
underlying barriers to desired outcomes and insufficiently appreciate the political economy 
context. 
3 The politics of knowledge creation and policy 
advocacy on formalisation   
Through the – brief – review of the literatures on tax registration and property titling, we have 
sought to illustrate that when the presumed benefits of ‘formalisation’ are not forthcoming, 
there is value in reconsidering the conceptual foundations of formalisation itself.  Naturally, 
the empirical claims here are not entirely new – meta-analyses of empirical studies, including 
by World Bank analysts, have likewise found that the effectiveness of interventions to induce 
formalisation and the benefits of formalisation for both firms and states are often 
disappointing (e.g. Bruhn and McKenzie 2014). Nevertheless, there has long been policy 
enthusiasm for ‘formalisation’, including among influential international policy actors, like the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and among domestic policymakers. 
While these dynamics are naturally multi-faceted, we argue that the continued, persistent 
presence of formalisation on policy agendas in LMICs can in part be understood through the 
power dynamics of knowledge creation and policy advocacy. With regard to formalisation 
policies, we observe a ‘technocratic tendency’, with international development partners, 
researchers, domestic policymakers, and public sector administrators prioritising evidence 
and policy interventions that are presented as ‘technocratic’ and ‘apolitical’, and, crucially, 
not sufficiently contextually specific.46 This is underpinned by imprecise conceptions of both 
informality and what it means to ‘formalise’, limited attention to diversity within the informal 
economy, and assumptions about the potential benefits of formalisation. In a policy context, 
the conceptual fallacies that we have discussed throughout this paper take on a distinct 
practical relevance: they can lead to the exclusion of contextual knowledge of the informal 
economy and the political dynamics embedded within it in favour of ‘global’ technocrats 
armed with ‘generalisable’ – though often poorly substantiated – theories of formalisation 
detailing its expected benefits. 
While theories extolling the benefits of formalisation have not emerged from any one 
discipline, industry, or geographic context, certain actors have been particularly influential in 
promoting formalisation policies in low-income countries.47 In particular, as demonstrated 
through their programmatic and research outputs, some international organisations, 
including the World Bank, OECD, and IMF, have prioritised ‘formalisation’ as a policy 
 
46  Notably, there has long been a broader parallel prioritization of ‘technical’ expertise and desire for ‘technocratic’ 
solutions in the field of development. In the early days of colonialist development, this manifested as the rise to 
prominence of ‘a cadre of technical experts who genuinely believed in the power of science to improve the lives of 
Africans’ (Decker and McMahon 2020: 111; see also Hodge 2007). 
47  For a deeper discussion of the importance of knowledge production and power in the diffusion of norms and behaviour 
in the context of low-income countries, see for example Bertelli et al. (2020) and Swedlund (2017). 
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approach (Russell 2010; OECD 2007, 2017; Gurría 2019; Innovation Policy Platform n.d.; 
Durand-Lasserve et al. 2007).48 Moore (2020), for example, notes that the ‘registration 
obsession’ among revenue authorities has been driven in part by international organisations 
such as the World Bank and IMF. In part, this follows from a longstanding, but still widely 
embraced, intellectual legacy that imagines informality as incompatible with modernity, 
growth, and sustainable development.49 Historically, this has been  closely related to 
modernisation theory, which saw informality at odds with ‘modernity’ and the expected 
benefits that would accompany it (see e.g. Lewis 1954, Huntington 1968; Lerner 1958; 
Touraine 1988). A post-colonial embrace of modernisation theory and state-centric 
approaches to development saw the ‘modern’ sector as destined to ‘take over any sphere of 
production or any market which may be developed through non-capital intensive activities, 
thus destroying the informal activities’ (Bienefeld 1975: 71).50 This has been increasingly 
challenged in recent years:  there is ample evidence of the ways in which informality is not at 
odds with modernity, but instead deeply intertwined with the contemporary logics of 
economic development and political rule. However, more traditional conceptions of 
formalisation nevertheless appear to have remained prominent within the policy sphere, with 
‘the idea of the “formal as superior” established’ (Banks et al. 2020) and, as described, 
notions of ‘development through formalisation’ continuing to capture the attention of 
international and domestic policymakers.51  
As has been well established in related discussions, international actors can influence policy 
agenda-setting and policymaking in low-income countries, with aid-dependent countries 
often facing pressures to be responsive to international organisations and donors (see e.g. 
Bertelli et al. 2020; Swedlund 2017; Thomas 2015;  Andersen and Therkildsen 2007; Dreher, 
Langlotz and Marchesi 2017; Sobhan 1996). In this context, government actors may feel 
pressure to undertake formalisation policies because of their dependence on international 
actors or resources, even when they are well aware of the political or administrative 
challenges of formalising (see Moore 2020). As a practical example of how this influence 
manifests, bilateral and institutional donors use the number of registered taxpayers as 
performance indicators within programmes (Moore 2021: FN xvii).  
Meanwhile, international organisations are not the only actors shaping policymaking in this 
space. Private sector actors, particularly accountancies and consultancies, play an important 
role in influencing policymaking in some contexts, as have think tanks and research 
 
48  Of course, international organisations are not monoliths and do not share a coordinated position on these issues and 
have also produced more critical work on issues of formalisation; see for example Keen (2012); Pimhidzai and Fox 
(2012); Bruhn and McKenzie (2014). More fundamentally, it is true that international organisations often have a ‘lack of 
institutional memory’, with the ‘World Bank in particular, over the last half-century or so [pursuing] contradictory 
strategies, often within a decade of each other’ (Hart 2009). We do not discuss the ILO’s policy on formalisation here. 
The ILO has been an increasingly visible actor in this space, particularly in the context of its Recommendation 204. 
Closely connected to its ‘decent work’ agenda, with a larger focus on employment rights and a history of closer 
interaction with informal organisations and local advocacy groups in this space, the ILO’s work on formalisation has a 
somewhat different dynamic than many of the other actors discussed here, and hence goes beyond the scope of this 
section.  
49  For a recent exploration of the negative association between informality and indicators of sustainable development see 
Özgür, Elgin and Elveren (2021). Notably, this perspective has roots in imperialism and the prioritisation of legibility in 
state-building, reflected in colonial efforts to make subjects more legible as a means of controlling and taxing them. For 
example, Banks et al. (2020: 230) note that, ‘The value placed on formality provides a legitimation of state presence 
and its associated activities, based in no small part on historical experiences in colonised countries that established the 
association between formality and superiority. In terms of economic activity and spatial settlement, the nexus of formal, 
moral value (associated with order), and safety and cleanliness were reinforced, and set against informality, disorder 
and dirt.’ 
50  For further discussion of this logic, see Tripp (1989); Radnitz (2011). This logic is evidenced in the case of colonial 
titling programmes that were based on the assumption that informal forms of property holding represent an earlier stage 
in a form of natural evolution of property rights that ends at individually held private property (Musembi 2007: 1463).  
51  It also appears likely that ideas around formalisation have benefited in policy circles from the fact that they are easily 
framed as part of a broader liberal reform agenda embraced by international organisations, with a focus, for instance, 
on policies that aim to strengthen neo-Weberian ‘good governance’, expand the tax base in order to reduce aid reliance 
and increase accountability, or support entrepreneurship ‘at the bottom of the pyramid’. 
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institutes.52 These actors often have various incentives to frame their work as ‘technical 
expertise’, transferable not only across geographic contexts but also diverse policy fields 
related to informality. The McKinsey Global Institute, for instance, has produced high-profile 
studies highlighting the productivity gains of formalisation (Farrell 2004). In the case of titling, 
for example, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), founded by Hernando de Soto, is 
particularly influential, as is the UN High Level Commission on Legal Empowerment of the 
Poor (Mitchell 2009; Obeng-Odoom 2013), which de Soto co-chairs. Their influence typically 
manifests through the provision of ‘technocratic’ analysis, policy impact evaluations, reform 
ideas, white papers, and partnerships between academics and policy practitioners,53 while 
being facilitated by the reality that policymakers and government institutions in low-income 
countries are often constrained in their capacity to engage in research, as a result of limited 
time and resources.54  
Furthermore, it is valuable to look at the role that researchers can play in shaping policy 
discourses. External research and policy evaluation support can certainly help policymakers 
and administrators overcome capacity constraints and usefully support evidence-based 
policymaking. It is likewise true, however, that power dynamics between policy-oriented 
researchers based in high-income and public sector administrators in low-income countries 
can shape research and policy processes in ways that are not always mutually beneficial 
(Maswime, Marsh and Atun 2020; Zimbalist 2020).55 Facilitated through research funding 
structures, foreign researchers partnering with public sector actors can at times significantly 
influence what is and should be researched.56 As Subramanian and Kapur (2021) argue:  
There is an inherent power imbalance between relatively weak developing-country 
governments and reputationally and financially powerful researchers, as well as tension 
between what policymakers in lower-income economies consider important and what 
academics deem worthy of publication in top journals. These factors surely privilege 
research that yields high private returns to researchers based in rich countries but 
meagre public returns to developing-country decision-makers.  
External researchers, particularly when relying on cross-country comparison, may be more 
likely to favour approaches that require key concepts and variables to be ‘measurable’, 
rather than approaches that may first seek to understand the complexity of the relevant 
concepts and to reflect on the quantifiability of key concepts.57  While rigorous policy impact 
evaluations, particularly through the use of randomised controlled trials (RCTs), can certainly 
have meaningful impact, Subramanian and Kapur (2021) likewise note that ‘the RCT 
movement… has had exclusionary consequences’ with respect to who has shaped research 
approaches and conceptualisations. ‘RCT-oriented’ researchers are often concentrated in 
 
52  For example, in Morocco, Roland Berger Strategy Consultants together with the General Confederation of Enterprises 
of Morocco (CGEM) have played a role in identifying strategies of how to ‘formalise’ Morocco’s informal economy. 
53  One example of such transplanting across regions can be found in ILD’s activism in North Africa after the 2011 
uprising, which saw partnerships with employers’ organisations across the region publish policy documents and lobby 
decision-makers based on what was largely framed as locally informed evidence and yet very starkly reflected ILD’s 
previous work in Latin America and, in particular, its conception of formalisation and titling. 
54  For a discussion of ‘bureaucratic overload’, see Dasgupta and Kapur (2020); and for evidence of the small scale of the 
public sector in low-income countries, see Besley and Persson (2014).  
55   While Ravallion (2020: 28) points out that ‘researchers should ideally be filling the gaps between what we know about 
the effectiveness of policies and what policymakers need to know’, he notes that ‘[t]his is clearly not happening as well 
as we might hope’. (See Ravallion (2009) for a discussion of ‘knowledge market failures’). 
56  Ravallion (2020: 33) notes:  ‘[T]he reality today is that, enamored by the promise of cleanly identifying a causal effect, 
many economists and other social and political scientists have been searching for something to randomize. If 
randomization is not feasible, they turn to ask another question.’ 
57  As Ulyssea (2020: 538) notes, ‘the decision to be formal is clearly not exogenous and can be affected by elements that 
are unobservable to the econometrician.’ At the same time, for example, it is easier to evaluate the impact of a 
formalisation policy if it is assumed that being ‘formal’ means one thing – as opposed to the reality that an individual or 
economic actor can have a range of relationships and interactions with the state that exist on a spectrum of formality 
and informality (see Section 2). 
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wealthy countries, while RCTs are often dependent on large-scale funding that has 
increasingly been concentrated in the richest universities (Ravallion 2020; Cavanagh et al. 
2021).58 This implies the exclusion of contextual expertise in favour of technical expertise. 
Moreover, as described above, when approaches to formalisation rely on an evolutionary 
logic, policy interventions often focus only on incentivising the first link in what is assumed to 
be a natural causal chain.59 Where policy-oriented research interventions do not address the 
structural constraints to the desired development outcomes, a narrow focus on achieving 
‘formalisation’ is unlikely to spur positive externalities. At the same time, there is often 
pressure on researchers to show the external validity of their findings, which may lead them 
to prioritise research designs that are easily replicable in diverse contexts.60 While this desire 
for replicability and generalisability does not mean that interventions will necessarily be 
decontextualised, it often creates incentives for researchers to replicate interventions and 
concepts rather than to design context-specific ones that are rooted in local knowledge and 
understanding of the political and social dynamics that may influence firm-level decisions 
about formalisation and shape the outcomes of any intervention. Accordingly, pressures on 
researchers to produce generalisable findings may lead them to deprioritise local voices and 
to rely on decontextualised concepts and indicators grounded in common a priori 
assumptions about formalisation – and, in particular, the conceptual fallacies that we have 
outlined above.61 
The power dynamics described above – influencing what is researched, how it is 
researched, and how it is framed – can in part help to explain both the continued policy 
enthusiasm for formalisation and the prevalence of some of the conceptual problems at its 
heart. While we have emphasised the role of international actors, domestic actors can 
likewise play roles in perpetuating the persistent prevalence of formalisation on policy 
agendas.62 Politicians and public sector actors may hold genuine beliefs about the benefits 
of formalisation in a particular context or may have political incentives that motivated a focus 
on informal sector actors rather than more politically sensitive ones. For example, Moore 
(2020) argues that a focus on formalisation in the context of tax registration serves to distract 
political attention from the widespread failure of the wealthy elite to pay tax. In some 
contexts, moreover, the logic of formalisation may be embedded within the longstanding 
aforementioned logics of imposing state control or a state-centric model of economic 
development (Tripp 1989). Indeed, maintaining the idea of ‘the formal as superior’ can 
become ‘a mechanism to strengthen elite governmentalities and associated discourses, 
perpetuating given hierarchies’ (Banks et al. 2020: 230). In any case, where these political 
motives exist, the incentives for domestic actors to frame formalisation as a solely 
technocratic exercise, distracting from other motives, are clear.  
 
58  Kim et al. (2021) further note that ‘[w]hen researcher identity defies the expectations of a typical profile of an academic 
affiliated with North American or European-based institutions (white and male, in particular)’, access to institutional 
funding may be limited for researchers. For more on the rise in influence of experimental research, see Donovan 
(2018); Pritchett (2020). 
59  As noted, for example, many ‘formalisation interventions’ focus on giving firms information about registration processes 
with the hope that other benefits will follow, rather than focusing on addressing the constraints to accessing or providing 
those benefits. 
60  For example, ‘the rational-formalist language’ embraced within the discipline of economics, but not limited to the 
discipline, leads researchers to have ‘universalistic aspirations’ (Fourcade, Ollion and Algan 2015: 110), often 
manifesting as replicable model testing and cross-country comparisons. 
61  More generally, there are distinct incentives for academics and researchers to accommodate a broad, 
de-contextualised and apolitical conception of formalisation. The pre-existing policy discourse on the issue facilitates 
both the communication of the ‘impact’ of research and the situation of research within an already existing ‘literature’. 
Framing formalisation broadly and imprecisely allows projects to draw on wider comparative set-ups that generalise 
across empirically diverse dynamics. Closely connected to this, and perhaps most importantly, it allows the result of 
empirically highly specific research projects to claim an external validity over much larger sets of issues and contexts. 
62  Indeed, recognising the agency of domestic actors is necessary to understand the negotiation of broader development 
discourses (see e.g. Decker and McMahon 2020: 55–66). 
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4 A new research and policy agenda 
The previous sections have highlighted central conceptual weaknesses at the heart of 
common formulations of formalisation. As we argue, the dynamics of knowledge creation 
and policy advocacy in this space have both reinforced these conceptual issues and 
sustained an enthusiasm around formalisation that has not been substantiated by the 
empirical record of a range of formalising interventions. Consequently, a revised conceptual 
approach is necessary, and will necessarily need to be embedded in revised practices of 
knowledge creation and advocacy. In what follows, we suggest the conceptual, empirical, 
and methodological features of an analytic approach to formalisation that allows for both 
more insightful exploration of specific formalisation processes and more useful comparisons 
across different types of formalisation. Having located key issues with the dominant 
discourse on formalisation in the overly broad application of the concept, we suggest that a 
novel research agenda should be built around more precise formulations of the diverse 
processes of formalisation, with distinctions between different types of formalisation more 
readily recognised, alongside greater emphasis on the context in which particular processes 
are unfolding. Consequently, and in contrast to the conceptual fallacies outlined in Section 2, 
formalisation should be conceptualised as fundamentally relational, conditional, and political. 
First, formalisation should be further approached as relational in the sense that it describes 
the (re)institutionalisation of a relationship between an individual or firm and a formal 
institutional structure. This contrasts with the common assumption that formalisation confers 
a feature of a firm or an individual, i.e. that the process of formalisation turns a firm or 
individual from ‘informal’ to ‘formal’. Instead, processes of formalisation change not a feature 
of the firm or individual, but the relationship between an actor and a state structure – for 
example by providing one with more information about the other, setting up a new 
contractual arrangement, or adding one to a pre-existing registry. Analysing these changes 
therefore requires looking beyond the firms and individuals involved, to also look at the state 
actors involved, at their interactions with the informal actor, and how they change as a result 
of the formalisation intervention. 
Second, formalisation should be conceptualised as conditional, given that there are multiple 
points of connection between individuals, firms, and formal institutional structures. A specific 
process of formalisation therefore refers to only a particular subset of these relationships, 
and rarely all of them. Research, results, and recommendations on formalisation should 
therefore specify the types of connections affected and situate them in their wider context. 
This should be as specific as possible – specifying not just ‘taxpayer registration’, for 
example, but the type and level of registration and the actor being registered and noting 
which other forms of interaction and barriers exist alongside this particular form of 
connection. Similarly, the benefits of formalisation should be conceptualised as conditional, 
recognising that the positive externalities of specific policy interventions are often far from 
guaranteed. If spillover effects to other processes of formalisation are expected, researchers 
should make the expectations and the related assumptions explicit, while policy interventions 
should consider potential, context-specific structural constraints along every link in the 
hypothesised causal chain. 
Third, formalisation should be conceptualised as a political, rather than a merely 
technocratic, process. The terms of a particular formalisation process are frequently 
contested, with different actors holding varying preferences over their content and power 
over the distribution of associated resources. Consequently, formalisation processes are 
best analysed in the context of the wider political economy of a particular affected activity or 
population, rather than being seen as mere technical ‘upgrading’ or organising. In particular, 
formalisation processes should be seen as active sites of negotiation of the terms of citizen–
state and business–state relationships. Within these, the interests of the actors involved are 
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not merely shaped by narrow conceptions of profit maximisation or cost avoidance, but also 
by wider perception of their relationship with the state and its wider role and the politics that 
characterise it. With this approach, it should be clear that formalisation processes rarely start 
from the blank state of a previously non-existing relationship or institutional blank slate but 
are instead characterised by previous histories of interaction. 
From this perspective, ‘formalisation’ as a wider term does not refer to one particular policy 
or process but may be used as an umbrella term to refer to a broad range of processes that 
reflect a restructuring of the relationship between informal economies and formal state and 
economic institutions. If treated this way, literatures on specific formalisation processes can 
more usefully speak to each other. For example, lessons from specific formalisation 
processes can help to identify and elucidate broader patterns in the development of new 
intersections between informal firms, households, and the state. For example, do particular 
sub-populations, such as women or informal migrant workers, face particular challenges in 
developing new linkages with the state? Identifying such patterns and systematic barriers 
across diverse formalisation processes may usefully tell us something about the broader 
nature of the accessibility of formal institutions and the diversity of state–society relations. 
Moreover, comparison across specific formalisation processes can also provide insights into 
how the legibility of informal structures is negotiated and contested. In some contexts, for 
instance, firms may wish to remain unregistered with the tax or health authority or to forgo 
access to public services not because – or only because – they wish to evade taxes or lack 
the information they need to register, but because they wish to avoid the potentially coercive 
arm of the state (Levy 2008; Perry et al. 2007). Being able to analyse the dynamics of 
legibility across diverse policy strategies can therefore deepen our understanding of 
policymakers’ motivations in these processes as well as individual- and firm-level resistance 
to them (see e.g. Scott 1998). 
From this re-conceptualisation of formalisation follows a set of empirical areas of inquiry that 
may characterise a new research agenda. First, there is a clear need for a better 
understanding of the diversity of formalisation initiatives, the different types of fiscal and 
administrative relationships to which they give rise, and the ways in which political, 
economic, and social contexts affect these dynamics. Second, research in recent years has 
highlighted the wide array of informal taxes and payments to which many economic actors, 
especially in LMICs, are subject. From this follow crucial questions about how informal 
revenue generation interacts with formalisation processes and how different populations may 
be differently affected. Finally, and in line with the argument developed above, while much 
previous work has focused on formalisation from a revenue or productivity perspective, there 
is significant scope for more work on formalisation from an equity perspective. 
While a broad area of inquiry naturally opens opportunities for a range of different 
methodologies, some approaches may be particularly useful to deepen our understanding of 
the conditional and political nature of formalisation, producing new perspectives that are 
often excluded from work in this area.  
• First, there is a need for more genuinely bottom-up or interpretivist explorations of 
formalisation processes that can inductively generate new concepts and observe 
dynamics rather than merely field-test dominant hypotheses. This may be facilitated, 
for instance, through ethnographic studies of specific formalisation processes, as well 
as collaborative research with researchers and organisations that represent informal 
workers or economic clusters.63 Especially in LMICs, engagement with these actors 
can help break down hierarchies in knowledge creation and can help centre local 
contextual expertise. Such methodological approaches may be particularly useful in 
 
63  The research outputs and partnerships generated by WIEGO on related issues in the study of informal economies in 
recent years present an excellent example of this kind of work. 
 25 
helping researchers to pinpoint why specific interventions in a policy context fail to 
produce expected outcomes, while helping to overcome normative assumptions 
about what constitute ‘good’ outcomes.  
• Second, there is scope for more mixed-methods approaches to the study of 
informality, combining the rich contextual knowledge required to understand the 
meaning and dynamics of informality in any context with the rigour of statistical policy 
impact evaluations in order to inform policy that is both evidence-based and 
grounded in reality. While a consideration of the ways in which survey-based 
approaches may draw on contextual expertise is beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
reasonable to consider that a more nuanced definition of ‘informality’, capturing 
multiple relationships with formal institutional actors may significantly increase the 
utility of these large-scale and expensive data collection efforts.  
• Third, there is a need for work that situates formalisation processes within wider 
questions of power and citizen–state relationships and that looks beyond firm-level 
and rational choice perspectives. This could involve embracing historical analysis, 
recognising that processes of formalisation far predate the more recent policy 
attention given to the issue.  
In rethinking the conceptual foundations of formalisation, new challenges also emerge for 
policymakers. First, policies should be grounded in contextual knowledge about specific 
types of relationships between informal actors and formal institutions, rather than relying on 
general ‘best practices’ or findings from other contexts. Policy strategies should be rooted in 
an understanding of political and social dynamics and be clearly targeted both 
geographically and sectorally. As we observed in Section 3, policymakers will benefit from 
engaging with a more diverse set of epistemic communities. As noted above, policymakers 
frequently over-rely on actors who have been perceived to contribute ‘technical’ expertise at 
the risk of overlooking grounded contextual expertise. Greater engagement with local actors 
who are familiar with the environment of informal work, including representatives of informal 
associations and organisations and civil society actors, would help to alleviate blind spots, 
identify biases in the inputs to the policymaking process, and design policy interventions that 
are better aligned with the contextual realities facing informal workers.64  
Additionally, policymaking in this field should clearly delimit the goals of any policy 
intervention. As we have highlighted above, the assumption that the formalisation of certain 
relationships will necessarily lead to the formalisation of others and to broader positive 
development outcomes is frequently spurious and highly dependent on the type of 
programme and the groups targeted. Understanding the assumptions built into theories and 
policy interventions should help policymakers think about discrete policy goals and target 
populations more explicitly.65 At the same time, policies may usefully focus on ensuring the 
benefits of formalisation, rather than only on the bureaucratic or punitive sides. As described 
by WIEGO (n.d.), ‘Formalization projects fail when governments ask informal 
workers/enterprises to register and pay taxes and tolls… without giving informal actors the 
benefits that formal workers/enterprises enjoy’. Instead, what may be the impacts of a policy 
that aims primarily to deliver services to informal actors, rather than to change their informal 
status? Overall, as WIEGO (2020) and others have highlighted, policymakers need to 
 
64  Two related challenges emerge. One is the fact that this broader engagement may lead the input to be perceived as 
more political rather than merely ‘technical’. We argue, however, that a successful approach towards formalisation 
should be political and participatory in nature. Another challenge is the fact that in many contexts, informal work is not 
well organised, and that, where it is, organisations are not always representative or easy for policymakers to approach. 
Furthermore, if policymakers are more actively involved in seeking out intermediaries, the risks of cooptation of 
organisational leaders are high. We argue that this points to another advantage of engagement with a broader set of 
actors in the policymaking process, including researchers and a wider set of civil society organisations. 
65  For example, formalisation policies that are explicitly aimed at increasing revenue should, both for equity and efficiency 
considerations, steer clear of some of the poorest but most populous groups of informal workers, such as street 
vendors or day labourers. Instead, high net worth individuals, such as professional sector workers who are informal by 
avoiding registering their business or declaring incomes, would provide more suitable targets. 
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recognise the limits of formalisation. If done well, formalisation represents a targeted but 
ongoing process of engaging with individuals and firms, rather than a one-off engagement 
from which other benefits follow automatically. As highlighted above, informal economies 
include sets of extremely diverse economic activities and diverse actors. No single 
formalisation policy will fit all, and for some activities, no form of formalisation will be able to 
sustainably support livelihoods, increase revenue, or achieve other anticipated benefits. As a 
consequence, formalisation needs to be understood as one aspect of a wider set of policies 
that connect states and informal economies, rather than as a ‘rationalising’ silver bullet.  
References 
Adler, D.; Porter, D.J. and Woolcock, M. (2008) Legal Pluralism and Equity: Some 
Reflections on Land Reform in Cambodia, SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1133690, 
Rochester NY: Social Science Research Network  
Alcázar, L.; R. Andrade and M. Jaramillo (2010) Panel/Tracer Study on the Impact of 
Business Facilitation Processes on Enterprises and Identification of Priorities for 
Future Business Enabling Environment Projects in Lima, Peru – Report 5: Impact 
Evaluation After the Third Round, Report to the International Finance Corporation, 
Washington DC: World Bank Group  
Alm, James; Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Wallace, Sally (2005) ‘Introduction to the 
Volume’, in J.R. Alm; J. Martinez-Vazquez and S. Wallace (eds), ‘Taxing the Hard-to-
Tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice’, Contributions to Economic Analysis 268: 3–8 
(accessed 29 June 2021) 
Almunia, Miguel; Gerard, François; Knebelmann, Justine; Nakyambadde, Dorothy and Tian, 
Lin (2017) An Analysis of Discrepancies in Tax Declarations Submitted Under Value-
Added Tax in Uganda, IGC Report S-43312-UGA-1, London: International Growth 
Centre, London School of Economic and Political Science 
Anaafo, David and Guba, Bismarck (2017) ‘Do Land Reforms Have Adverse Impacts on the 
Livelihoods of Poor Land Users? Evidence from the Nkoranza South Municipality, 
Ghana’, Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Études 
Africaines 51.2: 293–318 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Andersen, Ole Winckler and Therkildsen, Ole (2007) Harmonisation and Alignment: The 
Double-Edged Swords of Budget Support and Decentralised Aid Administration, 
DIIS Working Paper 2007/4, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies 
Anthias, P. and Radcliffe, S.A. (2015) ‘The Ethno-Environmental Fix and its Limits: 
Indigenous Land Titling and the Production of Not-Quite-Neoliberal Natures in Bolivia’, 
Geoforum 64: 257–69 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Araujo-Bonjean, Catherine and Chambas, Gerard (2005) ‘Taxing the Urban Unrecorded 
Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in J.R. Alm; J. Martinez-Vazquez and S. Wallace 
(eds), ‘Taxing the Hard-to-Tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice’, Contributions to 
Economic Analysis 268: 313–29 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Baaz, M.; Lilja, M. and Östlund, A. (2017) ‘Legal Pluralism, Gendered Discourses, and 
Hybridity in Land-Titling Practices in Cambodia’, Journal of Law and Society 44.2: 
200–27 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
 27 
Bachas, Pierre; Kondylis, Florence and Loeser, John (2021) ‘Increasing Tax Revenue in 
Developing Countries’, Development Impact, World Bank blog, 1 February (accessed 
29 June 2021) 
Bahl, Roy (2005) ‘Reaching the Hardest to Tax: Consequences and Possibilities’, in 
J.R. Alm; J. Martinez-Vazquez and S. Wallace (eds), ‘Taxing the Hard-to-Tax: Lessons 
from Theory and Practice’, Contributions to Economic Analysis 268: 337–54 (accessed 
29 June 2021) 
Banks, Nicola; Lombard, Melanie and Mitlin, Diana (2020) ‘Urban Informality as a Site of 
Critical Analysis’, Journal of Development Studies 56.2: 223–38 (accessed 29 June 
2021) 
Benda-Beckmann, Franz von (2003) ‘Mysteries of Capital or Mystification of Legal Property?’ 
Focaal 41: 187–91 
Benhassine, Najy; McKenzie, David; Pouliquen, Victor and Santini, Massimiliano (2018) 
‘Does Inducing Informal Firms to Formalize Make Sense? Experimental Evidence from 
Benin’, Journal of Public Economics 157 (January): 1–14 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Bertelli, Anthony M.; Hassan, Mai; Honig, Dan; Rogger, Daniel and Williams, Martin J. 
(2020) ‘An Agenda for the Study of Public Administration in Developing Countries’, 
Governance 33.4: 735–48 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Besley, Timothy (1995) ‘Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence 
from Ghana’, Journal of Political Economy 103.5: 903–37 
Besley, Timothy and Persson, Torsten (2014) ‘The Causes and Consequences of 
Development Clusters: State Capacity, Peace, and Income’, Annual Review of 
Economics 6: 927–49 
Bienefeld, M.A. (1975) ‘The Informal Sector and Peripheral Capitalism: The Case of 
Tanzania’, IDS Bulletin 6.3: 53–73 
Bird, Richard M. and Wallace, Sally (2005) ‘Is It Really So Hard to Tax the Hard-to-Tax? The 
Context and Role of Presumptive Taxes’, in J.R. Alm; J. Martinez-Vazquez and 
S. Wallace (eds), ‘Taxing the Hard-to-Tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice’, 
Contributions to Economic Analysis 268: 121–58 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Bräutigam, Deborah (2002) ‘Building Leviathan: Revenue, State Capacity and Governance’, 
IDS Bulletin 33.2: 10–20 
Brockmeyer, Anne; Smith, Spencer; Hernandez, Marco and Kettle, Stewart (2019) ‘Casting a 
Wider Tax Net: Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica’, American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy 11.3: 55–87 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Broegaard, Rikke J. (2005) ‘Land Tenure Insecurity and Inequality in Nicaragua’, 
Development and Change 36.5: 845–64 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Bruhn, Miriam (2011) ‘License to Sell: The Effect of Business Registration Reform on 
Entrepreneurial Activity in Mexico’, The Review of Economics and Statistics 9.1:  
382–6 
Bruhn, Miriam and McKenzie, David (2014) ‘Entry Regulation and the Formalization of 
Microenterprises in Developing Countries’, World Bank Research Observer 29.2:  
186–201 
 28 
Bruhn, M. and McKenzie, D. (2013) Using Administrative Data to Evaluate Municipal 
Reforms: An Evaluation of the Impact of Minas Facil Expresso, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 6358, Washington DC: World Bank, Policy Research 
Department 
Campos, Francisco; Goldstein, Markus and McKenzie, David (2015) Short-Term Impacts of 
Formalization Assistance and a Bank Information Session on Business Registration 
and Access to Finance in Malawi, Policy Research Working Paper, Washington DC: 
The World Bank 
Cárdenas, M. and Rozo, S. (2007) ‘La informalidad empresarial y sus consecuencias: ¿Son 
los CAE una solución?’, Documento de Trabajo 38, Bogota, Colombia: Fedesarrollo  
Cavanagh, Jack; Duru, Maya; Gupta, Sabhya; Kopper, Sarah and Welch, Keesler (2021) 
‘Evidence from the AEA RCT Registry on New Research during Covid-19’, 
Development Impact, World Bank blog, 17 May (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Christensen, Darin and Garfias, Fancisco (2019) ‘Enabling Local Fiscal Capacity through 
Business Formalization – EGAP’, Pre-analysis plan, EGAP Metaketa (accessed 
29 June 2021) 
Cousins, Ben et al. (2005) ‘Will Formalizing Property Rights Reduce Poverty in South 
Africa’s “Second Economy”? Questioning the Mythologies of Hernando de Soto’, 
PLAAS Policy Brief 18, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 
Cummings, Ronald; Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge; McKee, Michael and Torgler, Benno (2005) 
Effects of Tax Morale on Tax Compliance: Experimental and Survey Evidence, 
International Studies Program Working Paper 05–16, Atlanta GA: Andrew Young 
School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University 
Dasgupta, Aditya and Kapur, Devesh (2020) ‘The Political Economy of Bureaucratic 
Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India’, American Political 
Science Review 114.4: 1316–34 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
De Andrade, Gustavo Henrique; Bruhn, Miriam and McKenzie, David (2016) ‘A Helping 
Hand or the Long Arm of the Law? Experimental Evidence on What Governments Can 
Do to Formalize Firms’, The World Bank Economic Review 30.1: 24–54 (accessed 
29 June 2021) 
De Giorgi, Giacomo and Rahman, Aminur (2013) ‘SME’s Registration: Evidence from an 
RCT in Bangladesh’, Economics Letters 120.3: 573–78 
De La O, Ana L. et al. (2021) Fiscal Contracts?: A Six-Country Randomized Experiment on 
Transcaction Costs, Public Services and Taxation in Developing Countries, 12 May, 
EGAP Metaketa (accessed 19 July 2021) 
 
De Mel, Suresh; Mckenzie, David and Woodruff, Christopher (2013) ‘The Demand for, and 
Consequences of, Formalization among Informal Firms in Sri Lanka’, American 
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5.2: 122–50 
 
De Mel, Suresh; McKenzie, David and Woodruff, Christopher (2010) ‘2. Who Are the 
Microenterprise Owners?’, in Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar, International 
Differences in Entreprenership, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press: 63–88 
(accessed 19 July 2021) 
 29 
De Paula, A. and Scheinkman, J.A. (2011) ‘The Informal Sector: An Equilibrium Model and 
Some Empirical Evidence’, Review of Income and Wealth 57: S8–26 
De Soto, Hernando (2003) The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West 
and Fails Everywhere Else, reprint edn, New York NY: Basic Books 
De Soto, Hernando (1989) The Other Path, reprint edn, New York NY: Basic Books 
Decker, Corrie and McMahon, Elisabeth (2020) The Idea of Development in Africa: 
A History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Deininger, Klaus (2003) Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction, World Bank Policy 
Research Report, Washington DC: The World Bank 
D’Erasmo, P.N. and Boedo, H. (2012) ‘Financial Structure, Informality and Development’, 
Journal of  Monetary Economics 59: 286–302  
Djankov, S.; Porta, R.L.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2002) ‘The Regulation of 
Entry’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 1–37 
Dolan, Catherine and Rajak, Dinah (2016) ‘Remaking Africa’s Informal Economies: Youth, 
Entrepreneurship and the Promise of Inclusion at the Bottom of the Pyramid’, Journal 
of Development Studies 52.4: 514–29 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Domeher, Daniel and Abdulai, Raymond (2012) ‘Access to Credit in the Developing World: 
Does Land Registration Matter?’, Third World Quarterly 33.1: 161–75 (accessed 
29 June 2021) 
Donovan, Kevin P. (2018) ‘The Rise of the Randomistas: On the Experimental Turn in 
International Aid’, Economy and Society 47.1: 27–58 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Dreher, Axel; Langlotz, Sarah and Marchesi, Silvia (2017) ‘Information Transmission and 
Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs: Information and Ownership in Aid 
Programs’, Economic Inquiry 55.4: 1671–88 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Dube, Godwin (2014) ‘Informal Sector Tax Administration in Zimbabwe’, Public 
Administration and Development 34.1: 48–62 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Dube, Godwin and Casale, Daniela (2016) ‘The Implementation of Informal Sector Taxation: 
Evidence from Selected African Countries’, EJournal of Tax Research 14.3: 601–23 
Durand-Lasserve, Alain and Royston, Lauren (2002) ‘International Trends and Country 
Contexts – From Tenure Regularization to Tenure Security’, in Alain Durand-Lasserve 
and Lauren Royston (eds), Holding Their Ground, London: Routledge: 17–50 
(accessed 29 June 2021) 
Durand-Lasserve, Alain; Fernandes, Edesio; Payne, Geoffrey and Rakodi, Carole (2007) 
Social and Economic Impacts of Land Titling Programmes in Urban and Peri-Urban 
Areas: A Review of the Literature, Oslo: Government of Norway: 83 (accessed 19 July 
2021) 
Dwyer, M.B. (2015) ‘The Formalization Fix? Land Titling, Land Concessions and the Politics 
of Spatial Transparency in Cambodia’, Journal of Peasant Studies 42.5:  
903–28 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Engelschalk, Michael (2005) ‘Creating a Favorable Tax Environment for Small Business’, in 
J.R. Alm; J. Martinez-Vazquez and S. Wallace (eds), ‘Taxing the Hard-to Tax: Lessons 
 30 
from Theory and Practice’, Contributions to Economic Analysis 268: 275–311 
(accessed 29 June 2021) 
Evans, Martin; Harkness, Susan and Salomon, Heiner (2020) Informal Taxes and Transfers 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, ODI Working Paper 598, London: Overseas Development 
Institute 
Fajnzylber, Pablo; Maloney, William F. and Montes-Rojas, Gabriel V. (2011) ‘Does Formality 
Improve Micro-Firm Performance? Evidence from the Brazilian SIMPLES Program’, 
Journal of Development Economics 94.2: 262–76 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Farrell, Diana (2006) ‘Tackling the Informal Economy’, McKinsey Global Institute (blog), 
8 May (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Field, Erica (2007) ‘Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in Peru’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 122.4: 1561–602 
Field, Erica (2003) Fertility Responses to Land Titling: The Roles of Ownership Security and 
the Distribution of Household Assets, Working Paper (accessed 19 July 2021) 
Field, Erica and Torero, Maximo (2006) Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among 
the Urban Poor? Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program, Research Program in 
Development Studies Working Paper 223, Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
(accessed 29 June 2021) 
Fields, G. (1990) ‘Labour Market Modelling and the Urban Informal Sector: Theory and 
Evidence’, in D. Turnham; B. Salome and A. Schwarz (eds), The Informal Sector 
Revisited, Paris: OECD: 49–69 
Firmin-Sellers, Kathryn and Sellers, Patrick (1999) ‘Expected Failures and Unexpected 
Successes of Land Titling in Africa’, World Development 27.7: 1115–28 (accessed 
29 June 2021) 
Floridi, Andrea; Demena, Binyam Afewerk and Wagner, Natascha (2020) ‘Shedding Light on 
the Shadows of Informality: A Meta-Analysis of Formalization Interventions Targeted at 
Informal Firms’, Labour Economics 67 (December): 101925 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Fourcade, Marion; Ollion, Etienne and Algan, Yann (2015) ‘The Superiority of Economists’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 29.1: 89–114 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Galiani, Sebastian and Schargrodsky, Ernesto (2010) ‘Property Rights for the Poor: Effects 
of Land Titling’, Journal of Public Economics 94.9: 700–29 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Galiani, Sebastian; Meléndez, Marcela and Ahumada, Camila Navajas (2017) ‘On the Effect 
of the Costs of Operating Formally: New Experimental Evidence’, Labour Economics 
45 (April): 143–57 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Gallien, Max (2020a) ‘Smugglers and States: Illegal Trade in the Political Settlements of 
North Africa’, PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) 
(accessed 29 June 2021) 
Gallien, Max (2020b) ‘Informal Institutions and the Regulation of Smuggling in North Africa’, 
Perspectives on Politics 18.2: 492–508 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Gallien, Max and van den Boogaard, Vanessa (2021 forthcoming) ‘Informal Workers and the 
State: The Politics of Connection and Disconnection during a Global Pandemic’, ICTD 
Working Paper, Institute of Development Studies 
 31 
Gallien, Max; Moore, Mick and Van den Boogaard, Vanessa (2021) Taxing the Informal 
Economy Is Not a Silver Bullet for Financing Development – or the Covid-19 Recovery, 
ICTD Summary Brief 24, Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies (accessed 19 
July 2021) 
Gasparini, L. and Tornarolli, L. (2009) ‘Labor Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Patterns and Trends from Household Survey Microdata’, Desarrollo y Sociedad 63: 
13–80 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Gauthier, Bernard and Gersovitz, Mark (1997) ‘Revenue Erosion Through Exemption and 
Evasion in Cameroon, 1993’, Journal of Public Economics 64 (June): 407–24  
Gauthier, Bernard and Reinikka, Ritva (2001) Shifting Tax Burdens Through Exemptions and 
Evasion: An Empirical Investigation of Uganda, Policy Research Working Paper 2735, 
Washington DC: World Bank 
Gërxhani, Klarita (2004) ‘The Informal Sector in Developed and Less Developed Countries: 
A Literature Survey’, Public Choice 120.3/4: 267–300 
Giorgi, G.D.; Ploenzke, M. and Rahman, A. (2018) ‘Small Firms Formalisation: The Stick 
Treatment’, Journal of Development Studies 54.6: 983–1001 
Gottlieb, Jessica; LeBas, Adrienne and Obikili, Nonso (2019) ‘Formalization, Tax Appeals, 
and Voluntary Compliance in Lagos, Nigeria’, Pre-analysis plan (updated version), 
EGAP Metaketa (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Grady, C.; Chen, L.; Dulani, B.; Masumbu, M.; Bowers, J.; and Winters, M. (2020) Can an 
Information Campaign about Taxation and Service Delivery Increase Tax 
Compliance?, Working Paper (accessed 19 July 2021) 
Gurría, Angel (2019) ‘Written Statement to the Development Committee – 2019 IMF and 
World Bank Annual Meetings’, 2019 IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings, OECD 
(accessed 30 June 2021) 
Hart, Keith (2009) On the Informal Economy: The Political History of an Ethnographic 
Concept, CEB Working Paper 09/042, Brussels: Centre Emile Bernheim, Université 
Libre de Bruxelles 
Hendrix, Steven E. (1995) ‘Myths of Property Rights’, Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 12: 183 
Hirsch, P. (2011) ‘Titling Against Grabbing? Critiques and Conundrums Around Land 
Formalisation in Southeast Asia’, paper presented at the International Conference on 
‘Global Land Grabbing’, 6–8 April (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Hodge, Joseph Morgan (2007) Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development 
and the Legacies of British Colonialism, Athens OH: Ohio University Press 
Holland, Alisha C. (2015) ‘The Distributive Politics of Enforcement’, American Journal of 
Political Science 59.2: 357–71 
Honig, Dan (2020) ‘Information, Power, and Location: World Bank Staff Decentralization and 
Aid Project Success’, Governance 33.4: 749–69 (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Hoy, Christopher; McKenzie, Luke and Sinning, Mathias (2020) Improving Tax Compliance 
Without Increasing Revenue: Evidence From Population-Wide Randomized Controlled 
 32 
Trials in Papua New Guinea, Policy Research Working Paper 9539, Washington DC: 
World Bank (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Huntington, Samuel (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven CT: Yale 
University Press 
Hussmanns, Ralf (2004) Measuring the Informal Economy: From Employment in the 
Informal Sector to Informal Employment, Working Paper 53, Geneva: International 
Labour Office 
ILO (2018) Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture, Geneva: 
International Labour Organization 
ILO (2015) Recommendation 204: Recommendation Concerning the Transition from the 
Informal to the Formal Economy, Recommendation adopted by the 104th International 
Labour Conference, 12 June, Geneva: International Labour Organization (accessed 
30 June 2021) 
Innovation Policy Platform (n.d.) ‘Formalising the Informal Sector’, Innovation Policy Platform 
(OECD and World Bank Group) (accessed 2 February 2021)  
Jolevski, Filip and Ayana Aga, Gemechu (2019) ‘Shedding Light on the Informal Economy: 
A Different Methodology and New Data’, Let’s Talk Development, World Bank blog, 
20 April (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Joshi, Anuradha and Ayee, Joseph (2008) ‘Associational Tax:  A Pathway into the Informal 
Sector?’, in Deborah Brautigam, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Mick Moore (eds), Capacity 
and Consent: Taxation and State Building in Developing Countries, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 183–211 
Joshi, Anuradha; Prichard, Wilson and Heady, Christopher (2014) ‘Taxing the Informal 
Economy: The Current State of Knowledge and Agendas for Future Research’, Journal 
of Development Studies 50.10: 1325–47 (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Jouste, Maria; Nalukwago, Milly I. and Waiswa, Ronald (2021) Do Tax Administrative 
Interventions Targeted at Small Businesses Improve Tax Compliance and Revenue 
Collection? Evidence from Ugandan Administrative Tax Data, WIDER Working Paper 
2021/17, Helsinki: UNU-WIDER (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Kanbur, Ravi (2009) Conceptualising Informality: Regulation and Enforcement, Working 
Paper 2009–11, New York NY: Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics 
and Management 
Kangave, Jalia; Nakato, Suzan; Waiswa, Ronald and Zzimbe, Patrick Lumala (2016) 
Boosting Revenue Collection through Taxing High Net Worth Individuals: The Case of 
Uganda, ICTD Working Paper 45, Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies 
(accessed 30 June 2021) 
Kangave, Jalia; Nakato, Susan; Waiswa, Ronald; Nalukwago, Milly and Lumala Zzimbe, 
Patrick (2018) What Can We Learn from the Uganda Revenue Authority’s Approach to 
Taxing High Net Worth Individuals?, ICTD Working Paper 72, Brighton, UK: Institute of 
Development Studies (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Kapaz, Emerson and Kenyon, Thomas (2005) The Informality Trap: Tax Evasion, Finance, 
and Productivity in Brazil, World Bank Other Operational Studies 11201, 
Washington DC: The World Bank (accessed 30 June 2021) 
 33 
Kaplan, David S.; Piedra, Eduardo and Seira, Enrique (2011) ‘Entry Regulation and 
Business Start-Ups: Evidence from Mexico’, Journal of Public Economics 95.11–12: 
1501–15 (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Keen, Michael (2012) Taxation and Development: Again, IMF Working Papers 2012.220: 1, 
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund  (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Kim, Eunji; Badrinathan, Sumitra; Choi, Donghyun Danny; Karim, Sabrina and Zhou, Yang-
Yang (2021) ‘Navigating “Insider” and “Outsider” Status as Researchers Conducting 
Field Experiments’, unpublished working paper (accessed 19 July 2021) 
Kingwill, R. et al. (2006) Mysteries and Myths: de Soto, Property and Poverty in South Africa, 
Gatekeeper Series 124, London: International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) 
La Porta, R. and Shleifer, A. (2008) ‘The Unofficial Economy and Economic Development’, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 47.1: 123–35 
Lediga, Collen; Riedel, Nadine and Strohmaier, Kristina (2020) 'You Do (and What You 
Don’t) Get When Expanding the Net – Evidence from Forced Taxpayer Registrations 
in South Africa', unpublished working paper (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Lenz, Anna-Katharina; Zucco, Cesar; Goldszmidt, Rafael and Valdivia, Martin (2019) 
‘Increasing Microentrepreneurs’ Formalization and Access to Social Security in Brazil – 
EGAP’, Pre-analysis plan (updated version), EGAP Metaketa (accessed 30 June 
2021) 
Lerner, David (1958) The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, New 
York NY: Free Press 
Levy, Santiago (2008) Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes: Social Policy, Informality and 
Economic Growth in Mexico, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 
Lewis, W. Arthur (1954) ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’, The 
Manchester School 22.2: 139–91 (accessed 19 July 2021) 
Ligomeka, Waziona (2019) Expensive to Be a Female Trader: The Reality of Taxation of 
Flea Market Traders in Zimbabwe, ICTD Working Paper 93, Brighton, UK: Institute of 
Development Studies (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Lijphart, Arend (1975) ‘II. The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research’, 
Comparative Political Studies 8.2: 158–77 (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Lijphart, Arend (1971) ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’, American 
Political Science Review 65.3: 682–93 (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Lindell, Ilda (2010) ‘Informality and Collective Organising: Identities, Alliances and 
Transnational Activism in Africa’, Third World Quarterly 31.2: 207–22 (accessed 
30 June 2021) 
Maloney, W. (2004) ‘Informality Revisited’, World Development 32.7: 1159–78  
Maloney, W.F. (1999) ‘Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban Labor Markets? 
Evidence from Sectoral Transitions in Mexico’, The World Bank Economic Review 
13.2: 275–302  (accessed 30 June 2021) 
 34 
Mascagni, Giulia and Mengistu, Andualem (2016) The Corporate Tax Burden in Ethiopia: 
Evidence from Anonymised Tax Returns, ICTD Working Paper 48, Brighton, UK: 
Institute of Development Studies (accessed 19 July 2021) 
Mascagni, Giulia; Santoro, Fabrizio; Mukama, Denis and Hakizimana, Napthal (2020) Active 
Ghosts: Nil-Filing in Rwanda, ICTD Working Paper 106, Brighton, UK: Institute of 
Development Studies (accessed 19 July 2021) 
Maswime, Salome; Marsh, Kevin and Atun, Rifat (2020) ‘International Research 
Collaborations: How Can We Shift the Power towards Africa?’, The Conversation 
(blog),16 July (accessed 30 June 2021) 
Mayega, Jova; Ssuuna, Robert; Mubajje, Muhammad and Muwonge, Lawrence (2019) How 
Clean is Our Taxpayer Register? Data Management in the Uganda Revenue Authority, 
African Tax Administration Paper 12, Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies 
(accessed 19 July 2021) 
McCarthy, Gerard (2018) ‘Regressive Democracy: Explaining Distributive Politics in 
Myanmar’s Political Transition’, PhD thesis, The Australian National University 
(accessed 30 June 2021) 
Meagher, Kate (2018) ‘Taxing Times: Taxation, Divided Societies and the Informal Economy 
in Northern Nigeria’, Journal of Development Studies 54.1: 1–17 (accessed 1 July 
2021) 
Meagher, Kate  (2014) ‘Disempowerment from Below: Informal Enterprise Networks and the 
Limits of Political Voice in Nigeria’, Oxford Development Studies 42.3: 419–38 
(accessed 1 July 2021) 
Meagher, Kate (2013) Unlocking the Informal Economy: A Literature Review on Linkages 
Between Formal and Informal Economies in Developing Countries, WIEGO Working 
Paper 27, WIEGO – Women in Informal Employment: Gobalizing and Organizing 
Meagher, Kate (2007) ‘Introduction: Special Issue on “Informal Institutions and Development 
in Africa”’, Africa Spectrum 42.3: 405–18 
Mill, John Stuart (1872) System of Logic, 8th ed., London: Longmans, Green, Reader and 
Dyer 
Mitchell, Timothy (2009) ‘How Neoliberalism Makes its World: The Urban Property Rights 
Project in Peru’, in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (eds), The Road from Mont 
Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press: 386–416 
Mitchell, Timothy (2002) Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, Oakland CA: 
University of California Press 
Mitchell, Timothy (1991) ‘The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their 
Critics’, The American Political Science Review 85.1: 77–96 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Mitra, Shalini (2017) ‘To Tax or Not to Tax? When Does it Matter for Informality?’, Economic 
Modelling 64 (August): 117–27 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Moore, Mick (2021) ‘Tax Obsessions: Taxpayer Registration and the Informal Sector in 
Sub-Saharan Africa’, unpublished working paper 
 35 
Moore, Mick (2020) What is Wrong with African Tax Administration?, ICTD Working 
Paper 111, Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies 
Moore, Mick (2008) ‘Between Coercion and Contract: Competing Narratives on Taxation and 
Governance’, in Deborah Bräutigam, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Mick Moore (eds), 
Taxation and State Building in Developing Countries:  Capacity and Consent, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 34–63 
Moore, Mick; Prichard, Wilson and Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge (2018) Taxing Africa: Coercion, 
Reform and Development, London, UK: Zed Books 
Monye, Judith and Abang, Oyintare (2020) ‘Taxing the Informal Sector – Nigeria’s Missing 
Goldmine’, Bloomberg Tax, 15 October  
Morange, Marianne (2015) ‘Street Trade, Neoliberalisation and the Control of Space: 
Nairobi’s Central Business District in the Era of Entrepreneurial Urbanism’, Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 9.2: 247–69 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Mullainathan, Sendhil and Schnabl, Philipp (2010) ‘5. Does Less Market Entry Regulation 
Generate More Entrepreneurs?’, in Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar, International 
Differences in Entrepreneurship, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press: 159–78 
(accessed 19 July 2021)  
Musembi, Celestine Nyamu (2007) ‘De Soto and Land Relations in Rural Africa: Breathing 
Life into Dead Theories about Property Rights’, Third World Quarterly 28.8: 1457–78 
Nygren, A. (2004) ‘Competing Claims on Disputed Lands: The Complexity of Resource 
Tenure in the Nicaraguan Interior’, Latin American Research Review 39.1: 123–53 
Obeng-Odoom, Franklin (2013) ‘The Mystery of Capital or the Mystification of Capital?’, 
Review of Social Economy 71.4: 427–42 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
OECD (2017) Shining Light on the Shadow Economy: Opportunities and Threats, 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (accessed 19 July 2021) 
OECD (2007) ‘Removing Barriers to Formalisation’, in OECD, Promoting Pro-Poor Growth,  
DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris: OECD Publishing: 75–83 (accessed 
1 July 2021) 
Ogembo, Daisy (2020) Taxation of Self-Employed Professionals in Africa: Three Lessons 
from a Kenyan Case Study, African Tax Administration Paper 17, Brighton, UK: 
Institute of Development Studies 
Ordonez, J.C.L. (2014) ‘Tax Collection, the Informal Sector, and Productivity’, Review of 
Economic Dynamics 17: 262–86 
Özgür, Gökçer; Elgin, Ceyhun and Elveren, Adem Y. (2021) ‘Is Informality a Barrier to 
Sustainable Development?’, in Sustainable Development 29: 45–65 (accessed 1 July 
2021) 
Paler, Laura; Prichard, Wilson; Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul and Samii, Cyrus (2017) Survey 
on Total Tax Burden in the DRC, London: Department for International Development 
Perry, Guillermo et al. (2007) ‘Informality: Exit and Exclusion’, World Bank Latin America and 
Caribbean Studies, Washington DC: World Bank 
 36 
Pimhidzai, Obert and Fox, Louise (2012) Taking from the Poor or Local Economic 
Development: The Dilemma of Taxation of Small Informal Enterprises in Uganda, 
Washington DC: World Bank 
Piza, C. (2018) ‘Out of the Shadows? Revisiting the Impact of the Brazilian SIMPLES 
Program on Firms’ Formalization Rates’, Journal of Development Economics 134: 
125–32 
Prichard, Wilson (forthcoming) ‘Rethinking Tax Morale: What Is It? How to Measure It? Why 
Is It Important?’, ICTD Working Paper, Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies 
Prichard, Wilson (2015) Taxation, Responsiveness and Accountability in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: The Dynamics of Tax Bargaining, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 
Prichard, Wilson and van den Boogaard, Vanessa (2017) ‘Norms, Power and the Socially 
Embedded Realities of Market Taxation in Northern Ghana’, African Studies Review 
60.1: 171–94 
Pritchett, Lant (2020) ‘Randomizing Development: Method or Madness?’, in Florent 
Bédécarrats, Isabelle Guérin and François Roubaud (eds), Randomized Control Trials 
in the Field of Development: A Critical Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Quan, J. (2000) ‘Land Tenure, Economic Growth and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in 
C. Toulmin and J. Quan (eds), Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa, 
London: Department for International Development (DFID), International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) and Natural Resources Institute (NRI): 31–50 
Radnitz, S. (2011) ‘Review: Informal Politics and the State’, Comparative Politics 43.3: 
35137 
Ravallion, Martin (2020) Should the Randomistas (Continue to) Rule?, NBER Working Paper 
27554, Washington DC: National Bureau of Economic Research 
Ravallion, Martin (2009) ‘Evaluation in the Practice of Development’, World Bank Research 
Observer 24.1 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Reerink, Gustaaf and van Gelder, Jean-Louis (2010) ‘Land Titling, Perceived Tenure 
Security, and Housing Consolidation in the Kampongs of Bandung, Indonesia’, Habitat 
International 34.1: 78–85 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Resnick, Danielle (2020) ‘Taxing Informality: Compliance and Policy Preferences in Urban 
Zambia’, Journal of Development Studies, November: 1–23 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Reyntjens, Filip (2016) ‘Legal Pluralism and Hybrid Governance: Bridging Two Research 
Lines’, Development and Change 47.2: 346–66 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Rocha, Rudi; Ulyssea, Gabriel and Rachter, Laísa (2018) ‘Do Lower Taxes Reduce 
Informality? Evidence from Brazil’, Journal of Development Economics 134 
(September): 28–49 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Rogan, Michael (2019) Tax Justice and the Informal Economy: A Review of the Debates, 
WIEGO Working Paper 41, WIEGO – Women in Informal Employment: Gobalizing and 
Organizing (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Roitman, Janet (2004) Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in 
Central Africa, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 
 37 
Russell, Barrie (2010) Revenue Administration: Managing the Shadow Economy, Technical 
Notes and Manuals, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund (accessed 1 July 
2021) 
Santoro, Fabrizio and Mdluli, Winnie (2019) Nil-Filing in Eswatini: Should the Revenue 
Administration Be Concerned?, African Tax Administration Paper 6, Brighton, UK: 
Institute of Development Studies (accessed 19 July 2021) 
Santoro, Fabrizio; Groening, Edward; Mdluli, Winnie and Shongwe, Mbongeni (2020) To File 
or Not To File? Another Dimension of Non-Compliance: The Eswatini Taxpayer 
Survey, ICTD Working Paper 110, Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies 
(accessed 19 July 2021) 
Saracoglu, D.S. (2008) ‘The Informal Sector and Tax on Employment: A Dynamic General 
Equilibrium Investigation’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32: 529–49  
Schneider, F. and Enste, D. (2000) ‘Shadow Economies: Size, Causes and Consequences’, 
Journal of Economic Literature 38: 77–114  
Scott, James C. (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed, New Haven CT: Yale University Press 
Scott, James C. (1992) Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, New 
Haven CT: Yale University Press 
Sobhan, R. (1996) ‘Aid Dependence and Donor Policy: The Case of Tanzania with Lessons 
from Bangladesh’s Experience’, in Sida (ed.), Aid Dependency: Causes, Symptoms 
and Remedies Project 2015, Stockholm: Swedish International Development Agency: 
111–245  
Subramanian, Arvind and Kapur, Devesh (2021) ‘The Absent Voices of Development 
Economics’, Project Syndicate (blog), 26 March (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Swedlund, Haley (2017) The Development Dance: How Donors and Recipients Negotiate 
the Delivery of Foreign Aid, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press (accessed 1 July 
2021) 
Tendler, Judith (2002) ‘Small Firms, the Informal Sector, and the Devil’s Deal’, IDS Bulletin 
33.3: 1–15 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Thomas, Melissa Annette (2015) Govern Like Us: U.S. Expectations of Poor Countries, New 
York NY: Columbia University Press 
Thuronyi, Victor (2005) ‘Presumptive Taxation of the Hard-to-Tax’, in J.R. Alm; J. Martinez-
Vazquez and S. Wallace (eds), ‘Taxing the Hard-to-Tax: Lessons from Theory and 
Practice’, Contributions to Economic Analysis 268: 101–20 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Titeca, Kristof and Rachel Flynn (2014) ‘‘‘Hybrid Governance,” Legitimacy, and (Il)Legality in 
the Informal Cross-Border Trade in Panyimur, Northwest Uganda’, African Studies 
Review 57.01: 71–91 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Torgler, Benno (2005) ‘Tax Morale and Direct Democracy’, European Journal of Political 
Economy 15.2: 525–31 
Torgler, Benno (2004) ‘Cross-Culture Comparison of Tax Morale and Tax Compliance: 
Evidence from Costa Rica and Switzerland’, International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology 45.1–2: 17–43 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
 38 
Torgler, Benno and Schneider, Friedrich (2007) Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance 
and Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis, Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion 
Paper 2563, Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor 
Touraine, Alain (1988) ‘Modernity and Cultural Specificities’, International Social Science 
Journal, November: 443–58 
Tripp, Aili Mari (1989) Defending the Right to Subsist: The State vs. the Urban Informal 
Economy in Tanzania, WIDER Working Paper 59, Helsinki: UNU-WIDER 
Turnovsky, S.J. and Basher, M.A. (2009) ‘Fiscal Policy and the Structure of Production in a 
Two-Sector Developing Economy’, Journal of Development Economics 88: 205–16  
Ulyssea, Gabriel (2020) ‘Informality: Causes and Consequences for Development’, Annual 
Review of Economics 12.1: 525–46 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Ulyssea G. (2019) ‘Formal and Informal Firm Dynamics’, unpublished, University of Oxford, 
Oxford, UK  
Ulyssea, Gabriel (2018) ‘Firms, Informality, and Development: Theory and Evidence from 
Brazil’, American Economic Review 108.8: 2015–47 (accessed 1 July 2021) 
USAID (2005) ‘Removing Barriers to Formalization: The Case for Reform and Emerging 
Best Practice’, Washington DC: USAID (accessed 1 July 2021) 
van den Boogaard, Vanessa; Prichard, Wilson and Jibao, Samuel (2019) ‘Informal Taxation 
in Sierra Leone: Magnitudes, Perceptions and Implications’, African Affairs 118.471: 
259–84 
van den Boogaard, Vanessa; Prichard, Wilson; Beach, Rachel and Mohiuddin, Fariya (2020) 
Strengthening Tax-Accountability Links: Fiscal Transparency and Taxpayer 
Engagement in Ghana and Sierra Leone, ICTD Working Paper 114, Brighton, UK: 
Institute of Development Studies (accessed 30 June 2021) 
van Gelder, Jean Louis (2007) ‘Feeling and Thinking: Quantifying the Relationship between 
Perceived Tenure Security and Housing Improvement in an Informal Neighbourhood in 
Buenos Aires’, Habitat International 31.2: 219–31 (accessed 29 June 2021) 
WIEGO (2020) ‘Rethinking Formalization’, WIEGO Blog, WIEGO – Women in Informal 
Employment: Gobalizing and Organizing (accessed 29 June 2021) 
WIEGO (n.d.) ‘Formalizing the Informal Economy’,  WIEGO Blog, WIEGO – Women in 
Informal Employment: Gobalizing and Organizing (accessed 29 June 2021) 
Woodruff, Christopher (2001) ‘Review of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital’, Journal of 
Economic Literature 39.4 (December): 1215–223 
Workneh, Amanuel Mekonnen and Mulugeta, Endalkachew (2019) Where the Gap Lay: 
Presumptive Income Tax Assessment for Small and Micro Enterprises in Addis Ababa 
City Administration, ICTD Working Paper 94, Brighton, UK: Institute of Development 
Studies (accessed 19 July 2021) 
World Bank (2020) Doing Business 2020: Comparing Business Regulation in 190 
Economies, Washington DC: World Bank (accessed 1 July 2021) 
Zimbalist, Zack (2020) ‘So Many “Africanists”, so Few Africans: Reshaping Our 
Understanding of “African Politics” through Greater Nuance and Amplification of 
 39 
African Voices’, Review of African Political Economy 47.166: 621–37 (accessed 1 July 
2021) 
 
